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Using a large panel of firms across the world from 1991-2006, we show that the median foreign firm
has lower idiosyncratic risk than a comparable U.S. firm. Country characteristics help explain variation
in the level of idiosyncratic risk, but less so than firm characteristics. Idiosyncratic risk falls as government
stability and respect for the rule of law improve. Idiosyncratic risk is positively related to stock market
development but negatively related to bond market development. Surprisingly, we find that idiosyncratic
risk is generally negatively related to corporate disclosure quality. Finally, idiosyncratic risk generally
increases with shareholder protection. Though there is evidence that R
2 increases with creditor rights
and falls with the quality of disclosure, these results are driven by the relations between these variables
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A large literature makes predictions on how country characteristics affect firm idiosyncratic risk.
1 In this 
literature, greater financial development and better governance make it possible for risks to be shared 
more efficiently among investors. Greater risk-sharing enables firms to take more idiosyncratic risks as 
these risks are diversified away and do not affect the cost of capital. With better governance, agency costs 
are controlled more effectively, so that firms can raise capital with less co-investment by insiders. As 
insiders hold less of a stake in their firm, their wealth is less sensitive to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk and 
they are more willing to take projects that make the firm riskier if these projects increase firm value. With 
better governance, more information is produced about firms enabling investors to monitor management 
and insiders more effectively. To the extent that the United States has good governance and high financial 
development, this literature would lead us to expect foreign firms to have lower idiosyncratic volatility 
than comparable U.S. firms. 
In this paper, we investigate whether firms with similar characteristics have different idiosyncratic 
risk because they are in different countries and whether differences in idiosyncratic risk across countries 
are related to country institutions, investor protection, financial development, and economic development. 
In  comparing  the  idiosyncratic  risk  of  foreign  firms  to  U.S.  firms,  it  is  important  to  compare  the 
idiosyncratic risk of firms with similar characteristics since it is well-known that firm characteristics like 
firm age, market-to-book, and firm size affect idiosyncratic volatility.
2 We match foreign firms to U.S. 
firms with the propensity score matching approach using a firm’s industry, assets, age, and market-to-
book ratio. To the best of our knowledge, no other large cross-country study of firm risk has made 
comparisons using firm-level characteristics. With this matching of foreign firms to U.S. firms, we find 
that foreign firms have lower idiosyncratic risk than comparable U.S. firms from 1991 to 2006 and that 
                                                 
1 Relevant  papers  are  in  the  growth  literature  (e.g.,  Acemoglu  and  Zilibotti  (1997)),  the  international  finance 
literature  (e.g.,  Obstfeld  (1994)),  and  the  finance  literature  (e.g.,  Morck,  Yeung,  and  Yu  (2000)).  We  provide 
additional references later in this section. 
2 Pastor and Veronesi (2003) develop a theoretical model which shows a negative relation between volatility and 
firm  age  and  a  positive  relation  between  volatility  and  market-to-book.  Their  empirical  work  supports  these 
predictions and also shows that firm size measured by the logarithm of total assets is negatively related to volatility.   2 
this is equally true for firms from developed and from less developed countries. Using medians, we find 
that the idiosyncratic risk of foreign firms is 14.2% lower than the idiosyncratic risk of matching U.S. 
firms. Though the difference in idiosyncratic risk between U.S. firms and foreign firms varies through 
time, foreign firms have significantly greater idiosyncratic risk in only two out of sixteen sample years.
3 
We also find that foreign firms have higher systematic risk and lower total risk than matching U.S. firms, 
but this evidence is more sensitive to time periods and sample restrictions. Finally, since Roll (1987), the 
R
2 statistic from market model regressions is widely used to investigate the extent to which firm-specific 
news  explains  stock-return  variation.  We  show  that  firms  from  developed  countries  have  lower  R
2 
statistics than firms from emerging markets, but U.S. firms have significantly lower R
2 statistics than both 
groups.  All these results also hold for a subsample of firms with a high level of trading and when we use 
unlevered returns, so that they cannot be explained by differences in liquidity or differences in leverage 
across countries. Further, these results hold when controlling for firm characteristics other than those used 
in the matching procedure. 
After having established that the result that U.S. firms have higher idiosyncratic volatility is robust, 
we investigate why idiosyncratic risk varies across countries. The existing literature offers theories on 
national determinants of idiosyncratic risk that we organize into four groups: 
1)  Country  risk.  One  theory  is  that  greater  country  risk,  in  the  form  of  a  higher  threat  of 
expropriation and/or macroeconomic volatility, makes firms riskier, and decreases the rewards 
to  risk-taking  at  the  firm  level.  As a  result, firms  take  fewer diversifiable risks  in  riskier 
countries. For instance, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) show for a sample of post-
communist  countries  that  weaker  property  rights  lead  to  less  entrepreneurial  activity.  An 
alternative theory is that country risk leads to more firm-specific shocks that firms cannot 
mitigate, thereby increasing idiosyncratic risk. 
                                                 
3 Specifically, we find higher idiosyncratic risk of foreign firms during 1997 and 1998, the years of the Asian crisis 
and other global market turmoil (e.g., Russian default, the demise of Long-term Capital Management, etc.).   3 
2)  Investor  protection.  With  better  protection  of  minority  shareholders,  corporate  insiders 
consume fewer private benefits. As shown by John, Litov and Yeung (2008), private benefits 
make insiders have a debt claim on the firm and hence lead them to take fewer risks. We 
would  therefore  expect  idiosyncratic  risk  to  increase  as  shareholder  protection  improves. 
Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2008) show that better creditor protection can lead firms to take 
fewer  risks,  especially  when  managers  are  likely  to  lose  their  position  in  the  event  of  a 
bankruptcy filing. In addition, with better investor protection corporate insiders hold a smaller 
stake in their firm, so that their wealth is less sensitive to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk and 
hence they are more willing to take riskier projects (Stulz (2005)). 
3)  Financial  development.  With  greater  financial  development,  risk  can  be  shared  more 
efficiently among the owners of firms, which means that idiosyncratic risk becomes less of an 
issue in making investment decisions, and access to outside funding is less costly, so that firms 
can  cope  more  efficiently  with  unexpected  shocks  by  raising  funds.  Consequently,  firms 
become  more  willing  to  invest  in  riskier  projects  as  financial  development  improves  (for 
empirical evidence and references to the large theoretical literature see, for instance, Thesmar 
and Koenig (2004) and Michelacci and Schivardi (2008)). In light of the arguments of Acharya, 
Amihud and Litov (2008) and others, these predictions might be more relevant for equity 
market development than credit market development. When credit is a more significant source 
of funding, we would expect creditors to have more influence on firm decisions and to limit 
risk taking by firms.  
4)  Information  environment.  The  first  three  groups  of  determinants  of  idiosyncratic  risk  we 
discuss have to do with fundamental risk. However, alternatively, it could be that firms have 
more idiosyncratic risk in some countries because the information environment is better, so 
that more information is impounded in stock prices as argued by Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000). 
A better information environment might also reduce the extent to which firms suffer from 
agency  problems.  In  particular,  Jin  and  Myers  (2006)  provide  a  model  where  optimal   4 
consumption  of  private  benefits  in  less  transparent  environments  leads  firms  to  have  less 
idiosyncratic risk. 
To  take  advantage  of  the  panel  we  created,  we  want  indices  of  country  characteristics  that  are 
reported frequently. The International Country Risk (ICR) indices satisfy this requirement. We use the 
political risk index of ICR. This index measures government quality as well as respect of property rights. 
It is computed so that a higher value corresponds to less risk and is highly correlated with less frequently 
measured rule of law indices such as those in Kaufman, Kraay, and Matruzzi (2007). We find throughout 
the paper that there is a strong negative relation between the political risk index and idiosyncratic risk. 
When we divide the index into components associated with government and country stability on the one 
hand and components associated with lack of corruption and respect for property rights on the other hand, 
our results hold for both components of the index. These results are inconsistent with theories predicting 
that better government and better institutions lead to greater risk-taking at the firm level.
4 Rather, they 
suggest that poor government and institutions make firms riskier in ways that they cannot mitigate.  
Our measures of investor protection are the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and the creditor rights index of Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). A 
firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is generally, but not always, significantly positively related to the anti-self-
dealing index. Since a higher value of the index makes self-dealing more expensive for insiders, these 
regressions support the hypothesis that better governance leads firms to take more risk. However, for the 
same regression specifications, we also find that systematic risk is positively related to the anti-self-
dealing index. Though Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2008) show that firms are less risky along some 
dimensions  in  countries  that  protect  creditor  rights  better,  we  find  no  consistent  relation  between 
idiosyncratic risk and the creditor rights index, but creditor rights are generally positively related to 
systematic risk. 
                                                 
4 We follow the practice of viewing the ICR indices as proxies for institutions even though these indices do not 
measure permanent and deeply rooted country characteristics (see Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2004)).   5 
We proxy for equity market development using two common measures: stock market turnover (e.g., 
Levine and Zervos (1998)) and stock market capitalization to the size of the economy (e.g., Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz (2007)). In all our regressions for idiosyncratic volatility levels, at least one of these 
variables  has  a  significant  positive  coefficient  (and  often  both  are  significant).  Importantly,  in  these 
regressions, stock market turnover is not a proxy for firm stock liquidity since we control for this possible 
determinant  of  stock  return  volatility.
5 In  contrast,  credit  market  development  indicators  tend  to  be 
negatively related to idiosyncratic risk.     
Finally, we find that idiosyncratic volatility tends to be lower in countries with greater disclosure. Our 
evidence is consistent with evidence for the U.S. by Kelly (2007) and Teoh, Yang and Zhang (2008) that 
firms  with  a  worse  information  environment  are  more  volatile,  but  it  is  inconsistent  with  some 
interpretations  of  the  well-known  relation  between R
2  and  transparency  (see  Jin  and Myers  (2006)). 
Though, like the R
2 literature, we find that R
2 is negatively related to transparency, we also find that both 
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk fall as transparency increases. The systematic risk effect dominates 
the idiosyncratic risk effect, so that R
2 falls with transparency even though idiosyncratic risk falls with 
transparency as well. John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) find a positive relation between country-level cross-
sectional volatility in EBITDA to total assets and a measure of accounting disclosure requiring five years 
of data for each firm. Their result is not inconsistent with our evidence because their measure of risk can 
increase with the volatility of the systematic component in a firm’s EBITDA.
6 
This paper is connected closely to three strands of recent research. First is the research that, following 
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), investigates the determinants of the market model R
2 across countries. In 
the R
2 literature, the average R
2 in a country is negatively related to investor protection, so that the 
                                                 
5 Other researchers also find evidence consistent with turnover being a measure of equity market development.  For 
example, Li (2007) studies 33 global stock markets and finds that for most countries technological advances were 
more  important  for  determining  turnover  growth  than  were  improvements  in  macroeconomic  fundamentals  or 
institutional factors. 
6 To see this, suppose that a market model holds for EBITDA/Assets. If all firms have the same beta, the risk 
measure  of  John,  Litov,  and  Yeung  (2008)  just  measures  the  idiosyncratic  risk  in  EBITDA/Assets.  However, 
suppose alternatively that the betas differ and there is no idiosyncratic risk. In that case, their measure at the firm 
level is the absolute value of the market model beta of the firm minus one times the standard deviation of the 
country’s market factor in EBITDA.    6 
fraction of the risk of a firm that is idiosyncratic increases with investor protection. There is no necessary 
relation between a firm’s market model R
2 and the firm’s volatility or its idiosyncratic risk. The R
2 
literature explains the proportion of a firm’s total risk that can be attributed to idiosyncratic risk. In 
contrast, we focus on the determinants of a firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Our research shows that across 
countries one cannot infer that a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility increases with variables negatively related 
to a firm’s R
2. For instance, we find a strong positive relation between creditor rights and R
2, but it is 
explained by the relation between creditor rights and systematic risk rather than by the relation between 
creditor rights and idiosyncratic risk. Our paper also contributes to the R
2 literature by showing that there 
is a difference in R
2 between foreign firms and comparable U.S. firms in contrast to the existing literature 
which typically focuses on comparisons of country averages of R
2. 
The second literature closely related to our work is the literature on the time-series properties of 
idiosyncratic risk. Campbell et al. (2001) show that idiosyncratic stock return volatility increases in the 
United States from the 1960s to the 1990s. A number of papers build on this result, but recent papers 
question this finding altogether, attributing it to the nineties and arguing that idiosyncratic volatility falls 
in recent years (Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2008); Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2008)). Brown 
and Kapadia (2007) show that the trend in idiosyncratic risk occurs because more recent stock listings are 
more volatile and relate this finding to trends in equity market development. In our sample, we find that 
idiosyncratic risk follows an inverted u-shape for our foreign firms and for their matching U.S. firms, 
with idiosyncratic risk peaking early this century. The fact that the patterns of idiosyncratic volatility are 
similar  for  U.S. firms  and  foreign  firms,  though  differing  in  intensity,  shows  that  purely  U.S.-based 
explanations  of  the  time-series  pattern  of  idiosyncratic  volatility  are  unlikely  to  be  sufficient.
7 The 
literature has emphasized the role of competition and R&D in explaining the increase in idiosyncratic 
risk.
8 After  controlling  for  size,  market-to-book,  and  firm  age,  we  find  that  lagged  R&D  and  profit 
                                                 
7 Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2008) find that there is a high correlation in idiosyncratic volatility across developed 
countries and argue also that purely domestic explanations of the time-series of idiosyncratic volatility are likely to 
be insufficient.  
8 See Irvine and Pontiff (2005) and Comin and Philippon (2005).   7 
margins (which are inversely related to competition) are the most economically important determinants of 
idiosyncratic volatility together with lagged leverage. In particular, these variables are more economically 
important than country characteristics. 
Finally, the third literature for which our work is relevant is the literature that emphasizes that firms, 
at least to some extent, can influence the amount of idiosyncratic risk they bear. Firms can choose riskier 
projects, and whether they do so may depend on the incentives of insiders (see Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006)) for empirical evidence and references to the literature) as well as on the ability of firms to hedge 
various risks (see Stulz (2003) for a review). However, we do not find evidence that firms can manage 
their idiosyncratic risk to offset country risk characteristics. Country risk characteristics seem to increase 
all risk measures of a firm. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we describe our data and our matching procedure. In 
Section 2, we show that foreign firms have less idiosyncratic risk than comparable U.S. firms, that this 
risk difference holds after adjusting for leverage, and that it is not simply the product of differences in 
liquidity. In Section 3, we investigate why foreign firms have systematically lower idiosyncratic risk than 
U.S. firms. In Section 4, we compare R
2 at the firm level. We conclude in Section 5. 
1  Data 
We construct our sample by collecting annual accounting data on all firms in the WorldScope database 
from 1990 through 2006 in U.S. dollars. We drop firms that are missing data on total assets, market price 
at year end, book value per share, shares outstanding, book value of long-term debt, and book value of 
short-term debt. We also exclude American Depository Receipts (ADRs), non-primary issues, U.S. OTC 
Bulletin Board and ‘Pink Sheet’ stocks, firms with missing country or firm identifiers, as well as real 
estate and other investment trusts. We include other financial firms (e.g., banks, insurance companies, 
etc.).   8 
We match the remaining firms to stock return data from DataStream.
9 To enter the sample, firms must 
have available returns data for at least 25 weeks in the observation year. We use the percentage of weekly 
local currency stock returns equal to zero as a measure of trading frequency. The use of the frequency of 
non-trading as a measure of market liquidity is well-established in the literature (see, for instance, Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad (2006)).
10 We subsequently examine different cutoffs to see the effect on our 
results, but unless we say otherwise, our analysis is conducted using firm-year observations where the 
firm has less than 30% zero returns (e.g., nonzero stock returns for at least 36 weeks if return data are 
available for all weeks in a year).
11 This reduces the number of firms in our analysis by about 5% and the 
number of firm-years in our sample by about 20%.
12 We exclude country years where fewer than 10 firms 
have available data. This drops Slovakia, Slovenia, and Zimbabwe from the entire sample. To address 
concerns about data errors in Datastream, we also implement a commonly used filter for reversals in the 
data that could be caused by incorrect stock prices, and we winsorize the top and bottom 0.1% of the final 
sample of stock returns.
13 
The  resulting  primary  data  set  contains  167,693  observations  representing  49  countries.  Not 
surprisingly, however, the number of firms available increases steadily throughout the 1990s. We have 
roughly 4,000 firms in 1991, but the number of firms increases to roughly 21,000 towards the end of our 
                                                 
9 We match firms based on common identifiers (DataStreamcode, DataStream Mnemonic, Sedols, Cusips, ISIN, 
etc.) as best available. We impose a number of filters, because firms can have multiple share classes or listing 
locations.  For example, we screen on the security type, use only primary listings, and require that the currency of 
the stock price is a legal tender in the country of incorporation of the firm.  We also manually verify matches in 
many cases, because firms can have multiple share classes or listing locations.  Leading and trailing zeros in the 
return series are set to missing values. 
10 Trading volume data at the firm level cannot be used because reliable trading volume data at the firm level are not 
available for a large percentage of our firm years.  This is a well-known shortcoming of the international returns data 
available from Datastream.  Our aggregate turnover data examined subsequently are obtained from the WorldBank. 
11 Since our dependent variables use return data, we screen trading activity in the previous year to minimize any 
endogeneity bias. 
12 In most cases we lose some, but not all, years for a given firm because of a lack of non-zero return observations, 
thus the percentage of firms lost is much less than the percent of firm-years lost. 
13 In particular, we set Rt and Rt-1 to missing if |Rt| > 200% or |Rt-1| > 200% and Rt-1 + Rt < 50%. See Ince and Porter 
(2006) for a discussion of data errors in Datastream and possible solutions.   9 
sample period.
14 Not all countries are present each year. In particular, representation from developing 
economies  is  concentrated  in  the  latter  half  of the sample.  To  avoid  a  bias in  our  results  from  this 
imbalance in our data, all results are based on matching firms by the observation year. 
We also collect data on a variety of other firm characteristics from the WorldScope database. These 
include  the  percentage  of  shares  closely  held,  plant,  property  and  equipment  (PPE),  research  and 
development expenses (R&D), capital expenditures (CapEx), gross profit margin, and cash and short-term 
investments. We calculate ratios for most of these variables to make them comparable across companies. 
For R&D, we set missing values to zero. We measure firm age as the number of years between the listing 
date (or first date on DataStream) and the observation year plus one (so that we can take the natural 
logarithm). Accounting data are winzorized at the top and bottom 1% and for values more than five 
standard deviations from the median. We apply some limits to a few variables.
15 Variable definitions are 
summarized in the Appendix. 
In most of our analysis we are attempting to determine if or why non-U.S. firms have risk levels 
different from comparable U.S. firms. Across countries, firms often differ from the typical U.S. firm. We 
therefore look at foreign firms and “matching” U.S. firms to avoid comparing possibly very different firm 
types. To identify matching U.S. firms we employ propensity score (p-score) matching utilizing several 
characteristics.
16 In essence, the p-score provides a method for identifying a matching U.S. firm based on 
a variety of factors that we believe are inherent characteristics determining risk. In this comparison, we 
want to avoid using firm characteristics that may be determined at the same time as the risk measures, 
since  if  we  were  to  do  that  there  would  be  a  concern  that  both  our  risk  measures  and  our  firm 
characteristics are simultaneously determined. We mitigate this problem in two ways.  First, we use only 
                                                 
14 There are two primary reasons for this trend.  First, the total number of listings on WorldScope of all types 
increases  from  about  20,380  in  1991  to  35,322  in  2006.    Second,  the  data  availability  (and  liquidity)  screens 
eliminate a significantly higher percentage of firms in early years than in later years.  The proportion of U.S. versus 
non-U.S. firms affected by these screens is roughly constant over the sample period. 
15 Specifically, we limit gross profit margin to be greater than or equal to -100% and set market-to-book ratio to 20 
when it is greater than 20 or book value is less than or equal to zero. 
16 For earlier uses of this approach in finance, see Drucker and Puri (2005) and Lee and Wahal (2004) among others.   10 
lagged firm characteristics to match firms, so that we match firms on predetermined variables. Second, we 
match on variables that are likely to be exogenous firm characteristics. Specifically, we match U.S. firms 
(with replacement) to non-U.S. firms based on firm size (log of total assets measured in USD), the log of 
firm age, and the equity market-to-book ratio. We do this matching by year and by industry, one year 
prior to the observation year.
17 Overall, the quality of our matches is very high. For all matches, the 
average and median differences in p-score are essentially zero (<0.001) with a standard deviation of 
0.0079. The 5% to 95% range is -0.0038 to 0.0054. 
The country variables we use are as follows (Appendix A gives detailed definitions and sources for 
all these variables). We measure the quality of political and legal institutions using the ICR Political Risk 
index  as  reported  by  the  PRS  Group.
18 This  index  measures  the  overall  stability  and  quality  of 
government institutions using 10 different qualitative measures. Higher values represent more stable and 
higher quality government institutions. This index is highly correlated with other common measures of 
political and legal quality such as the Kaufman, Kraay, Matruzzi (2007) rule of law index (correlation 
equals 0.896), GDP per capita (correlation equals 0.802), and the Myers and Lin (2006) measure of 
country disclosure quality (correlation equals 0.767). We use the ICR Political Risk index because it 
measures a variety of institutional characteristics and data are available for every year and country in our 
sample.  In  our  analysis, we  split  the  index into  two  sub-indices: a  stability  component  (government 
stability,  socioeconomic  conditions,  internal  conflict,  external  conflict,  military  in  politics,  religious 
tensions,  ethnic tensions, democratic  accountablity)  and  a  law  and  order  component (law  and  order, 
investment profile, bureaucracy quality, corruption).  
As a proxy for shareholder protection and corporate governance we use the anti-self-dealing index 
from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). Data are only available for one year but 
their analysis suggests that the index is very stable over time. Higher values are associated with greater 
                                                 
17 Industries are defined using the updated 30 industry portfolio classification system available on Ken French’s web 
site.  We thank Ken French for making these data available. 
18 The ICR Guide is published by The PRS Group, 6320 Fly Road, Suite 102, East Syracuse, NY 13057-0248, USA.   11 
obstacles to self-dealing and hence better shareholder protection and governance. We also use the index 
of creditor rights from Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007); higher values represent better creditor 
rights. 
We utilize two proxies for equity market development that have been frequently used in the literature. 
The first measure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. The second measure is the stock 
market turnover rate which is total stock market volume as a percent of total shares outstanding. Though 
the latter measure is often used as a measure of equity market development, it is noteworthy that some of 
the highest values in our sample are from less economically developed countries. Our proxies for credit 
market  development  are  public  bond  market  capital  capitalization  to  GDP,  private  bond  market 
capitalization to GDP, private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, and private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Unfortunately, the credit variables are not available 
for all firm-years for which we have data for the other variables. About 10% of firm-years are missing 
and they are all from developing countries. We report results using the credit variables for the smaller 
sample, but all the other results use the larger sample. We also use as a proxy for overall financial 
development  the  capitalization  of  all  publicly-traded  securities  to  GDP.  Our  proxy  for  economic 
development is GDP per capita.  
Table 1 compares firm and country characteristics for the matched firms in our sample. In this table 
each observation is the average of available years for a foreign firm and its matching U.S. firm(s). Results 
for  the  matching  characteristics  show  that  on  average  we  match  firms  closely  on  the  chosen 
characteristics. Matching U.S. firms tend to be slightly larger and older. Since firm size and age are 
negatively associated with risk, this could lead to a bias toward finding that foreign firms are riskier. 
However, U.S. firms also have somewhat higher market-to-book ratios that could lead to a bias toward 
U.S. firms being riskier since market-to-book value is positively associated with risk. On average, the 
differences are economically small, which suggests that (the offsetting) biases are also likely to be small. 
As noted above, differences in p-scores are negligible and not statistically significant.   12 
Differences in leverage are not economically significant. Evaluated at the medians, the difference in 
leverage corresponds to roughly one percentage point. Using WorldScope’s measure of insider ownership, 
we find, not surprisingly, that the foreign firms have greater insider ownership than U.S. firms.
19 Foreign 
firms have a greater ratio of plant, property and equipment to total assets than U.S. firms and invest less in 
R&D. They are also less profitable, hold less cash, and have debt of shorter maturity. For foreign firms, 
about 9% of returns are zero which is roughly twice the percentage of U.S. firms. This difference in the 
percentage of zero returns raises the concern that infrequent trading could play more of a role for foreign 
firms than for U.S. firms and might lead to downward-biased measures of risk for foreign firms. 
Table 1 also compares country characteristics between foreign firms and matching U.S. firms. The 
country characteristics for foreign firms are an equally-weighted average of the country characteristics of 
the firms. The U.S. firms are from a country with lower political risk, weaker creditor rights, better 
protection  of  investors  against  self-dealing  by  insiders,  greater  market  turnover,  greater  market 
capitalization, greater GDP per capita, greater disclosure, lower market standard deviation.  Differences 
for credit market development depend on the measure.  The U.S. has a larger market for private bonds 
and other private credit.  However, private credit extended by banks is lower in the U.S. and government 
debt (public bond capital) is roughly the same in the U.S. as in other countries.    
2  Estimates of differences in volatility measures 
In this section, we compare risk measures for foreign firms to the risk measures of matching U.S. firms. 
We calculate three primary measures of firm volatility using weekly (Friday-to-Friday) USD closing 
prices to calculate returns (though our results are essentially unchanged if we conduct all of our analysis 
using local currency returns). The first measure of risk is simply the annualized standard deviation of 
weekly  stock  returns.  Our  other  two  measures  of  risk  are  obtained  by  decomposing  total  risk  into 
                                                 
19 For a description of the problems with this ownership measure, see Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2003).   13 
systematic  risk  and  idiosyncratic  risk  using  a  market  model.  Specifically,  for  each  firm-year  with 
sufficient data we estimate 
  1 1 1 1
M M M
t t t t t t t t R R R R α β β β ε − − + + = + + + +   (1) 
where Rt is the firm’s weekly stock returns, 
M
t R  is the return on the local market index, and εt is an error 
term. Our estimate of idiosyncratic volatility is the (annualized) standard deviation of εt, σ . Our estimate 
of systematic risk is the square root of the difference between total return variance and 
2 σ . We also 
examine the R
2 statistic from the regressions. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports mean and median values for our volatility measures for foreign firms and 
their matching U.S. firms. The values reported are for firm averages, so that each foreign firm appears 
only  once.  U.S.  firms  have  significantly  higher  total  volatility  (return  standard  deviation)  than  their 
matching foreign firms. The median difference in total risk of -0.038 translates into the median U.S. firm 
having total risk that is 8.6% higher than its foreign counterpart. Foreign firms have higher systematic 
risk  on  average  than  U.S.  firms,  but  the  median  difference  is  smaller.  Foreign  firms  have  lower 
idiosyncratic risk than U.S. firms, and the median idiosyncratic volatility of U.S. firms is 14.2% higher 
than the median idiosyncratic volatility of their matching foreign firms. Finally, the results for R
2 show 
that average R
2 is higher for foreign firms than for U.S. firms by roughly 27%, and median R
2 is higher 
for foreign firms by about 21%. All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Our sample is 
different in at least two ways from the samples used for studies that focus on the determinants of R
2 
across countries. First, we require firms to have data in WorldScope, which means that our sample has 
larger firms than studies that do not have that requirement. We will control for sample selection in our 
regressions. Second, our sample period covers more recent years. 
In the remainder of Panel A, we split the sample between firms in developed countries and firms in 
emerging  markets.  We  define  a  country  to  be  an  emerging  market  if  the  country  does  not  have  a 
completely liberalized equity market using the measure of Edison-Warnock. In contrast to developed 
market firms which have lower total risk than U.S. firms, emerging market firms have about the same   14 
average  total  risk  as  U.S.  firms.  Both  emerging  market  and  developed  market  firms  have  lower 
idiosyncratic risk than U.S. firms. Similarly, developed market and emerging market firms have a higher 
systematic risk and market model R
2 than U.S. firms. These results confirm the findings of Morck, Yeung 
and Yu (2000) when the R
2 comparison is made using comparable firms.  
Because the distribution of the risk measures is positively skewed, we also compare the logs of the 
risk measures but do not reproduce the results in the table. When using logs, the mean volatility of U.S. 
firms  is  not  significantly  different  from  the  mean  volatility  of  their  matching  firms.  The  other 
comparisons are unchanged. 
We saw in the previous section that foreign firms seem to trade less than U.S. firms. This result raises 
the concern that U.S. firms might be riskier because they are more liquid. To evaluate whether infrequent 
trading can explain our results, we show in Panel B of Table 2 estimates of risk measures for firms with 
less than 10%, less than 30%, and no restriction on zero returns. Restrictions on zero returns have an 
impact on the estimates of the risk measures. When we limit our comparison to firms with less than 10% 
zero returns, the mean difference in total risk is no longer significant. However, for all our comparisons, 
both the mean and median differences for systematic risk, idiosyncratic volatility, and R
2 are significant. 
One obvious candidate explanation for observed differences in volatility between foreign and U.S. 
firms is differences in financial leverage. Panel C of Table 2 also reports statistics for unlevered volatility 
measures. We use several definitions of leverage. There is no evidence that leverage differences across 
countries can explain the fact that foreign firms have lower volatility and idiosyncratic risk than matching 
U.S. firms. The differences in idiosyncratic volatility are essentially the same when we use unlevered 
idiosyncratic volatility, but differences in total risk are consistently more negative for unlevered total risk. 
This result suggests that the assets of foreign firms are somewhat less risky. 
In Table 3, we examine the stability of the volatility differences through time. We see first that firm 
volatility has an inverted u-shape pattern over our sample period. Foreign firms have higher volatility than 
matching U.S. firms for many years in the 1990s. This result is explained by the fact that foreign firms 
have much higher systematic risk than U.S. firms in the 1990s as compared to the 2000s. In contrast,   15 
there is consistent evidence that foreign firms have lower idiosyncratic risk than U.S. firms. There are 
only two years in our sample period when foreign firms have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk than 
U.S. firms. (These two years coincide with the 1997-1998 Asian and Russian financial crises.) In contrast, 
U.S. firms have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk at the 1% significance level than foreign firms in 14 
of 16 years. Finally, R
2 is significantly lower for U.S. firms in all years. It is interesting to note that 
idiosyncratic risk and R
2 differences evolve differently over our sample period. R
2 differences tend to fall 
over time; in contrast, idiosyncratic risk differences have a more complicated pattern, but seem to peak in 
2001 and 2002. Guo and Savickas (2008) examine the time-series pattern of idiosyncratic volatility for 
the G7 countries and also find them to be elevated in 2001 and 2002 across these countries. 
This  section  demonstrates  that  foreign  firms  consistently  have  lower  idiosyncratic  volatility  than 
comparable U.S. firms. Foreign firms have higher total volatility than matching U.S. firms in the 1990s 
but not in the 2000s because they have higher systematic risk in the 1990s but not in the 2000s. We show 
that the greater idiosyncratic volatility of foreign firms cannot be explained by differences in liquidity or 
differences in leverage. 
3  Why do foreign firms have lower idiosyncratic volatility? 
In this section, we estimate regression models to investigate the determinants of the difference in risk 
measures between foreign and U.S. firms. Though our primary focus is the difference in idiosyncratic 
volatility,  we  estimate  regression  models  for  all  three  risk  measures  as  these  models  help  us  better 
understand why idiosyncratic volatility differs across countries. In Section 4, we consider separately the 
determinants of R
2. In the regressions, we regress differences in risk measures on differences in country 
characteristics and on differences in firm characteristics. It is legitimate to be concerned that when the 
left-hand and right-hand side variables of these regressions are contemporaneous, these variables could be 
jointly  determined,  perhaps  as  a  function  of  some  omitted  variables.  This  problem  is  mitigated  by 
regressing a volatility measure at time t on firm and country characteristics at time t-1.    16 
Our  investigation  has  several  different  steps.  First,  we  estimate  country-level  Fama-MacBeth 
regressions that use only country characteristics as explanatory variables. Next, we estimate firm-level 
Fama-MacBeth regressions that also include firm characteristics as explanatory variables. Finally, we 
investigate Fama-MacBeth regressions for changes in risk variables. We use Fama-McBeth regressions, 
so that the fact that the number of firms is much larger towards the end of our sample period does not 
influence our results. As an alternative to Fama-MacBeth regressions, we estimate pooled regressions. We 
implement the pooled regressions in two different ways. First, we weight each firm-year equally. This 
traditional implementation gives a lot of weight to the more recent years in the sample because these 
years have a lot more firms. Second, we weight each year equally, so that the weight of a firm-year 
depends on the number of observations in that year. The use of these different approaches should alleviate 
the  concern  that  we  do  not  have  a  balanced  panel,  in  addition  to  helping  reduce  concerns  about 
endogeneity. Later in the section, we compare the estimates from the different methods. 
The dependent variables in our regressions are log differences in volatility measures between foreign 
firms and matching U.S. firms. We standardize the explanatory variables to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. (We standardize by year for Fama-MacBeth regressions.) This standardization 
allows us to interpret the intercept of the regression as the unexplained difference in volatility between 
foreign and U.S firms. The standardization also allows us to interpret estimated coefficients for variables 
as the effect on volatility of a one standard deviation change in the variables under consideration. 
Before turning to the regressions, we first present in Table 4 a correlation matrix of our dependent 
variables and of our country characteristics. The table uses median values for each country (calculated 
across available years to create single observations for each country). We see that there is typically a 
strong negative correlation between the ICR Political Risk indices and our volatility measures. This result 
holds for both the stability and law and order components.  The correlations for political risk are similar 
for  idiosyncratic  risk  and  for  systematic  risk.  In  contrast,  the  volatility  measures  have  low  and 
insignificant  correlations  with  the  creditor  protection  index  and  the  anti-self-dealing  index.  The 
correlations  of  the  volatility  measures  with  market  turnover  are  positive  and  weakly  significant  for   17 
idiosyncratic risk, but the correlations are negative with stock market capitalization to GDP (but only 
significant for systematic risk). The proxies for credit market development are negatively correlated with 
the volatility measures in most cases. In the following, we reproduce results only for the private bond 
market and the bank private credit measures to save space. We find a negative correlation between our 
volatility measures and our proxy for economic development, GDP per capita. The correlations between 
our volatility measures and the disclosure index are negative and high in absolute value, so that higher 
disclosure is associated with lower total, systematic, and idiosyncratic volatility at the firm level. The 
correlation table should caution us from inferring much from correlations between idiosyncratic risk and 
country  characteristics.  For  many  country  characteristics,  the  sign  of  the  correlation  is  the  same  for 
idiosyncratic risk and for systematic risk.  
3.1  Country-level regressions 
We first investigate country-level regressions. These estimations regress median differences in log risk 
measures on country characteristics. Such regressions allow for country characteristics to be related to the 
risk  measures  both  directly  and  indirectly  by  affecting  firm  characteristics.  For  instance,  if  firms  in 
countries with poor investor protection have less R&D and R&D is positively related with idiosyncratic 
risk, the coefficient on investor protection in country-level regressions that do not control for firm-level 
R&D would reflect both a direct effect of investor protection on idiosyncratic risk and the indirect effect 
through the lower level of R&D. Later, when we estimate regressions at the firm level and control for 
R&D, the coefficients on investor protection no longer reflect this indirect channel. It could be argued that 
country-level  regressions that  do  not  control for  firm  characteristics  are  more  appropriate  if  country 
characteristics are truly exogenously determined and firm-level characteristics are functions of country 
characteristics. Since only country characteristics vary in such regressions, it would be inappropriate to 
estimate them at the firm level.   
Table  5  reports  results  from  country-level  Fama-MacBeth  regressions.  Because  some  country 
variables are significantly correlated, we estimate a variety of specifications with different explanatory   18 
variables. However, the significant results across specifications are usually consistent. We use lagged 
explanatory variables to reduce potential problems with possible endogeneity of country variables. The 
average  cross-sectional  regression  includes  about  40  countries  (reported  as  observations).  In  these 
regressions, we use as the dependent variable the median difference between the risk measure of firms in 
a  country  and  the  matching  U.S.  firms.  We  regress  this  median  difference  on  lagged  differences  in 
country characteristics between foreign countries and the United States.  
In Table 5, we show regression estimates for our three volatility measures. We first consider the 
regressions using total risk. When estimating univariate regressions, we find that total risk is significantly 
negatively related to the ICR Political Risk indices, the credit market development proxies, GDP per 
capita, and the disclosure index. Higher values of the political risk index mean less risk, so that stock 
return volatility falls as political risk decreases. Note that a higher value of the disclosure index means 
better disclosure, so that better disclosure is associated with less total risk. Total risk is positively related 
to stock market turnover. Finally, total risk is not significantly related to the creditor rights index, the anti-
self-dealing index, or market capitalization as a percent of GDP.  
In multiple regressions, total risk is negatively related to the ICR Political Risk indices, GDP per 
capita and disclosure. We see that total risk is unrelated to creditor rights. The anti-self-dealing index has 
a positive significant coefficient. Both market capitalization and domestic stock market volatility have 
positive  significant  coefficients.  The  credit  development  proxies  have  negative  coefficients  but  only 
private bond capital is significant. We also include a variable that measures the fraction of the domestic 
market listings that our sample covers.
20 This market coverage variable controls for a possible bias from 
our database coverage; the positive coefficient indicates higher total risk as market coverage increases. 
Panel B estimates regressions where the dependent variable is systematic risk. Univariate regressions 
typically have coefficients with the same sign as the regressions for total risk. However, the stock market 
                                                 
20 Market coverage is defined for each country-year as the percentage of all listed firms that are in our sample in that 
year.  Data on the total number of listings comes from the World Federation of Exchanges (supplemented by data 
hand collected from individual exchange websites) and include only local country listings.   19 
turnover ratio is not significant whereas the anti-self-dealing index and stock market capitalization are 
significant. In multiple regressions, the signs of the coefficients are also generally similar but significance 
levels are lower. An exception is the creditor rights index which has a positive significant coefficient in 
four regressions out of six. Only the ICR political risk index, GDP per capita, the disclosure index, private 
bond capital and the domestic market index volatility are consistently significant. 
Finally, Panel C reports regressions where the dependent variable is idiosyncratic risk. The univariate 
regressions are similar to those for total risk. In the multiple regressions, the coefficients on political risk 
variables are negative and significant, so that greater political risk (i.e., a lower value of the index) is 
associated with higher idiosyncratic risk. The coefficient on creditor rights is not significant but the 
coefficient on the anti-self-dealing index is always positive and significant. The coefficients on turnover 
and stock market capitalization to GDP are usually positive and significant. Disclosure, GDP per capita, 
and  private  bond  capital  all  have  significant  negative  coefficients.  In  general,  the  credit  market 
development  proxies  have  negative  coefficients,  but  only  the  bond  market  development  proxy  has 
significant coefficients. The domestic stock market volatility has a positive significant coefficient. The 
market coverage variable, which proxies for selection, is always positive and significant. 
It follows from Table 5 that, surprisingly, countries with better disclosure and better respect for the 
rule of law tend to have lower idiosyncratic volatility. This result is robust to splitting the political risk 
index into two components, a country stability component and a law and order component. In contrast, 
shareholder rights as measured by the anti-self-dealing index seem to be positively related to idiosyncratic 
risk.  Further, stock market development is generally positively related to idiosyncratic volatility.   
3.2  Firm-level regressions 
We now estimate firm-level Fama-McBeth regressions using levels of variables controlling also for firm 
characteristics not used in our matching procedure. The firm characteristics we control for are the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to total assets, the gross profit margin averaged over the last three years, 
the ratio of cash and short-term securities to total assets net of cash and short-term securities, the ratio of   20 
total debt due in more than one year to total debt, and leverage. We also control for the firms’ percentage 
of zero returns and for the ratio of the number of firms covered in our sample relative to the number of 
total listed firms in each country to account for a possible selection bias due to the fact that not all firms 
are covered in DataStream and WorldScope. All firm characteristics are lagged. Remember that firms are 
matched on size, market-to-book and age, so that we do not control for these characteristics.  
Panel  A  of  Table  6  shows  the  regression  estimates  for  total  risk.  We  see  that  estimating  the 
regressions at the firm level and controlling for firm characteristics affects some of the coefficients of the 
country characteristics. The coefficient on market coverage is now insignificant and smaller in several 
regressions. In contrast, the coefficients on market capitalization roughly double in magnitude. Most other 
results for country factors are similar to those in Table 5. Remember that all our variables are normalized. 
We can therefore conclude that the ICR law and order index, GDP per capita, stock market capitalization, 
and domestic market index volatility are the most economically significant country-level variables for 
total risk. Firm-level variables are in many cases both economically and statistically more significant than 
the country variables. We find that firms with more PPE, greater profitability, and longer debt maturity 
are less volatile. The role of profitability is consistent with the arguments in the literature discussed earlier 
that greater competition is associated with less firm-level volatility. Firms with more cash, more R&D, 
more capital expenditures, and more leverage are more volatile. Not surprisingly, in light of our earlier 
results, the lagged percentage of zero returns is positive and significant. 
Next, we turn to systematic risk. The country characteristics have coefficients of the same sign as in 
the regressions for total risk and similar significance with a few exceptions. First, the index of creditor 
rights  has  a  positive  significant  coefficient.  Second,  the  turnover  ratio  has  a  negative  significant 
coefficient.  The coefficients on firm characteristics generally have the same sign as in the total risk 
regressions. An important exception is that the coefficient on the percentage of zero returns has a negative 
significant coefficient. 
Lastly, we examine the regressions for idiosyncratic risk. Though we do not reproduce the univariate 
regressions, the signs of coefficient estimates are similar to those of the country-level regressions. In   21 
particular, the coefficients on disclosure and on the credit market development proxies are negative and 
significant, the coefficient on turnover is positive and significant, and finally the coefficient on stock 
market capitalization to GDP is not significant. One difference is that the anti-self-dealing index does 
have  a  significant  positive  coefficient.  In  the  multiple  regressions,  most  coefficient  estimates  on the 
country  characteristics  are  similar  to  the  estimates  obtained  with  the  country-level  regressions  even 
though we now control for firm characteristics. This result suggests that the indirect effect of country 
characteristics – i.e., the relation between idiosyncratic risk and firm characteristics induced by the choice 
of  firm  characteristics  in  response  to  country  characteristics  –  is  extremely  limited  with  the  firm 
characteristics we use. Stock market turnover and stock market capitalization have positive significant 
coefficients except for one regression for stock market turnover. The private bond market development 
proxy is significant, but the private credit extended by banks is not. The coefficient on disclosure is 
negative and significant in all regressions but one. Firm characteristics have coefficients of the same sign 
and significance as in the total risk regressions.
21 
Our regressions provide no evidence that firms in a more risky environment are able to take steps to 
have less idiosyncratic risk to offset greater systematic risk. Firms in countries with a greater political risk 
index, which means countries with a more stable government and better law enforcement, have lower 
systematic risk  and  lower  idiosyncratic risk.  Consequently,  better respect  of property  rights  and  less 
corruption are associated with lower risk. Firms in countries with better developed equity markets have 
more idiosyncratic risk, but similar or less systematic risk. In contrast, firms in countries with better 
developed  bond  markets  have  less  idiosyncratic  risk.  The  creditor  rights  index  is  not  related  to 
idiosyncratic  risk,  but  countries  with  better  creditor  rights  have  more  systematic  risk.  The  anti-self-
dealing index is significantly positively related to idiosyncratic risk in half of our regressions and in the 
others it does not have a significant coefficient.  
                                                 
21 Importantly, the selection variable (market coverage) is not consistently significant, and when it is significant, it is 
negative.  This contrasts with the results in Table 5 and suggests that any significant problems with a bias toward 
excluding small stocks are accounted for by the firm-level variables.   22 
3.3  Other Regression Methods 
We explore the robustness of our results in a number of different ways. First, we estimate regressions 
with different firm-level control variables. The significance of the anti-self-dealing index depends heavily 
on the firm-level control variables. The coefficients on the other country-level variables are much less 
sensitive to which variables are included. Second, we estimate traditional panel regression models where 
we  consider  standard  errors  corrected  for  clustering  by  firm  and  country.  We  do  not  reproduce  the 
regression estimates in a table. These models give a lot more weight to recent years in the sample period 
because WorldScope has data for more firms in those years. Focusing on the regressions for idiosyncratic 
risk, we find that the equity market development variables have highly significant positive coefficients in 
all regressions, and other results are also similar to those in Table 6.  For example, the disclosure index 
always has a negative coefficient but the significance varies across specifications. Finally, we estimate 
panel regressions where we weight each year’s observations equally. The results are also consistent with 
the regressions in Table 6.
22  
One concern with the regressions discussed so far is that our variables could be correlated with 
unmodeled country or firm attributes. Estimating change regressions is one approach that helps alleviate 
these concerns. There are some serious limitations, however, with using such an approach. Institutions 
change slowly. As a result, changes in proxies for institutions are unlikely to have enough variability to 
have much explanatory power in change regressions. Specifically, some country variables exhibit very 
little time-series variation as compared to cross-country variation (e.g., ICR indices, creditor rights, credit 
market development proxies), and some of our proxies for institutions are observed only once. Further, 
firms are unlikely to make major decisions based on what could be temporary changes. For example, if 
changes in equity market development make it possible for riskier firms to become publicly traded, such 
an impact of equity market development may not be apparent before a number of years.  Nevertheless, 
firm-level characteristics typically change every year so these tests at a minimum serve as robustness 
                                                 
22 These findings are also robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects.   23 
checks for these variables. In addition, enough of the country variables change at least in some years that 
we can estimate such regressions. 
In  Table  7,  we  reproduce  Fama-MacBeth  firm-level  change  regressions.  The  regressions  are  the 
change versions of the regressions in Table 6, except that we cannot use the anti-self-dealing index or the 
disclosure index because these indices are not available on a yearly basis. Panel A reports results for total 
risk. As expected, none of the country-level variables are consistently significant. However, all the firm-
level characteristics are significant with the same sign as with the level regressions. When we turn to the 
systematic risk regressions, no country characteristic is consistently significant though the coefficient on 
creditor rights is positive and significant at the 10% level in three specifications. Again, all the firm 
characteristics  are  consistently  significant  except  debt  maturity.  Finally,  with  idiosyncratic  risk,  the 
coefficients on firm characteristics are all significant and of the same sign as coefficients estimated in the 
level regressions. No country-level variable is consistently significant, but surprisingly one of the political 
risk  measures  has  a  positive  significant  coefficient  in  one  regression,  and  turnover  has  a  negative 
significant  coefficient  in  some  regressions.  It  follows  from  Table  7  that  the  key  results  on  firm 
characteristics are robust across all our specifications and that we cannot learn much about the impact of 
country characteristics from change regressions.  
4  Idiosyncratic volatility, systematic risk, and R
2 
Following Mock, Yeung, and Yu (2000), a large literature has developed that focuses on explaining why 
R
2 differs across countries or within countries. A firm’s R
2 is simply the square of its systematic risk 
divided by the square of its total risk. Consequently, R
2 can fall because systematic risk falls, or because 
total risk increases for constant systematic risk. An increase in total risk not accompanied by an increase 
in systematic risk is an increase in idiosyncratic risk. As a result, there are two sources of variation in R
2: 
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. R
2 increases with systematic risk and falls with idiosyncratic risk. It 
is  well-established  that  R
2  falls  as  a  country’s  institutions  that  protect  investors  improve.  With  our 
approach in this paper, we can contribute to this literature by examining whether its results hold when   24 
controlling for firm characteristics and what the R
2 results tell us about the relation between idiosyncratic 
risk and a country’s institutions. Another way to put this is that we can address the question of whether 
firms with similar characteristics located in different countries still have R
2’s that are related to country 
characteristics. The answer is yes. 
Table  8  reports  results  from  country-level  Fama-MacBeth  regressions,  firm-level  Fama-MacBeth 
regressions, and firm-level change Fama-MacBeth regressions with the logistic transform of R
2 as the 
dependent variable. The R
2 literature has focused on averages of R
2 over a sample period at the country 
level. Here, we let R
2 change each year, and we also report results from estimations at the firm-level. We 
consider first country-level regressions. R
2 is negatively related to the political risk indices, bank credit, 
private bond capital, GDP per capita, and disclosure. Further, it is positively related to the creditor rights 
index,  but  this  is  because  the  creditor  rights  index  is  positively  related  to  systematic  risk.    Hence, 
countries with more stable political institutions, better rule of law, and better disclosure have a lower R
2 
as we would expect from the literature. The level of credit market development is negatively related to R
2.  
Equity  market  development  is  negatively  related  to  R
2  as  predicted  but  the  coefficients  are  not 
consistently significant.  
In  the  next  two  panels,  we  estimate  regressions  at  the  firm  level.  In  Panel  B,  we  use  levels  of 
variables.  Results  for  country  variables  are  similar  to  those  in  Panel  A,  except  the  credit  market 
development  variables  are  no  longer  significant  and  turnover  becomes  consistently  significant.  
Disclosure quality and stability of political institutions are the most economically significant country 
variables. It is important to note, however, that these variables are significant because of their correlation 
with systematic risk rather than because of their correlation with idiosyncratic risk. Several firm-level 
variables are strongly significant: profitability and debt maturity are positively related to R
2, while capex, 
percent  zero  returns,  and  leverage  have  negative  relations.  These  relations  are  identical  to  those  for 
idiosyncratic risk. In Panel C, we use change regressions. As with the change regressions for the risk 
variables, the country factors are generally not significant.  However, all of the firm-level factors are of 
the same sign and significance as in the level regressions, except capex which is no longer significant.    25 
  The  results  in  this  section  show  that  R
2  is  related  to  both  country  characteristics  and  firm 
characteristics. However, some of the coefficients on country characteristics are weaker when we control 
for  firm  characteristics.  Most  importantly,  one  cannot  infer  from  R
2  regressions  that  a  country 
characteristic is related to idiosyncratic risk because country characteristics are typically also related to 
systematic risk in the same way.  For example, the strong negative relation between political stability and 
R
2 does not imply a positive relation between political stability and idiosyncratic risk.  To the contrary, 
the results in Table 6 demonstrate a strong negative relation between political stability and idiosyncratic 
risk.   Instead the  result  for  R
2 is  driven  by  a stronger  negative  relation  for  systematic  risk  than  for 
idiosyncratic risk.  Our results have important implications for the interpretation of R
2 results in previous 
work.  Specifically, both country-level and firm-level factors can be important for determining the overall 
levels of risk and not just the relative composition.  In addition, some results that have been attributed to 
differences in idiosyncratic risk levels are actually driven by differences in systematic risk levels.  This is 
true for both country-level and firm-level characteristics.  Thus, a detailed analysis of the determinants of 
R
2 is necessary for understanding the relations between firm and country characteristics and risk attributes 
of a firm’s stock returns.  
5  Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine how firm idiosyncratic risk, as well as other firm risk measures and firm R
2, are 
related to country characteristics. We investigate this issue focusing on risk differences between foreign 
firms and similar U.S. firms. To carry out our analysis, we construct a large and unique global dataset that 
merges historical stock return data (from DataStream) with firm-level accounting data (from WorldScope) 
for the period from 1990 to 2006.  
  We  find  that  foreign  firms  have  lower  idiosyncratic  risk  than  comparable  U.S.  firms.  The 
difference in idiosyncratic risk between foreign and comparable U.S. firms is related to both country and 
firm characteristics. We find that an index that proxies for government quality and stability is strongly 
negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. This evidence suggests that firms have limited ability to offset   26 
firm-specific risks resulting from the overall riskiness of their country. In contrast, idiosyncratic risk 
increases with equity market development and falls with bond market development. Surprisingly, in most 
of our regressions there is a significant negative relation between disclosure and idiosyncratic risk, and no 
regression  has  a  positive  significant  relation.  There  is  no  consistent  evidence  of  a  relation  between 
creditor rights and idiosyncratic risk, but in many of our regressions there is a positive significant relation 
between the anti-self-dealing index and idiosyncratic risk. Yet, in R
2 regressions, there is clear evidence 
that R
2 increases as creditor rights are better protected and that it falls as disclosure increases. We show 
that these results are attributable to the relation between investor protection proxies and systematic risk, 
not idiosyncratic risk. Our evidence is consistent with the literature which stresses that firms can choose 
riskier projects in countries with better equity market development and shareholder protection. A possible 
alternative explanation for our evidence could be that financial development is associated with more 
trading, which leads to more volatility through noise trading. Further research is required to evaluate how 
financial  development  directly  affects  firm  decisions  and  to  assess  the  relevance  of  the  alternative 
explanation. 
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Table 1: Matched Sample Tests 
This table reports mean, median, and standard deviation (Std.Dev.) values for characteristics of Non-U.S. firms and matched U.S. firms. Annual values for each Non-
U.S. firm (and its matched U.S. firm(s)) are averaged so that each Non-U.S. firm appears only once. Variables are created using USD-denominated data. Firms with 
more than 30% of local currency stock returns equal to zero in the previous period are excluded. Matching is performed one year prior to the observation year by 
industry. The first part reports values for variables utilized in propensity score matching including the propensity scores. The second part reports values for the primary 
firm-level variables. The third part reports values for country-level variables. Not all variables are available for all firms. p-values from t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for 
differences in samples are reported in the last two columns. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
      Non-U.S. Firms     Matched U.S. Firms     Differences     p-values 
Variable  N  Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Means  Median     t-Test  Wilcoxon 
Matching Characteristics (lagged)                              
  Total Assets (log)  20,069  4.903  4.771  1.941    5.412  5.464  1.296    -0.509  -0.693    <0.001  <0.001 
  Firm Age (log)  20,069  1.750  1.835  0.851    1.967  2.030  0.649    -0.217  -0.195    <0.001  <0.001 
  Market-to-Book Value  20,069  2.434  1.719  2.367    2.305  1.999  1.455    0.129  -0.279    <0.001  <0.001 
  p-Score  20,069  0.820  0.852  0.124    0.819  0.851  0.123    0.000  0.000    0.733  0.602 
Firm Characteristics                             
  Leverage  19,914  0.268  0.231  0.223    0.241  0.227  0.144    0.026  0.004    <0.001  0.314 
  Closely Held Shares (%)  14,049  0.460  0.469  0.216    0.305  0.293  0.138    0.155  0.176    <0.001  <0.001 
  PPE (% Total Assets)  19,738  0.314  0.283  0.229    0.272  0.244  0.172    0.041  0.039    <0.001  <0.001 
  R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  20,069  0.011  0.000  0.046    0.031  0.006  0.060    -0.020  -0.006    <0.001  <0.001 
  Capital Expenditures (%Total Assets)  19,529  0.057  0.039  0.061    0.051  0.043  0.043    0.005  -0.004    <0.001  <0.001 
  Gross Profit Margin ( 3 yr. avg.)  17,995  0.220  0.210  0.247    0.278  0.282  0.178    -0.058  -0.072    <0.001  <0.001 
  Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  18,828  0.346  0.138  0.831    0.457  0.184  0.819    -0.111  -0.046    <0.001  <0.001 
  Debt Maturity   18,064  0.452  0.451  0.293    0.720  0.759  0.207    -0.268  -0.308    <0.001  <0.001 
  Percent Zero Returns (lagged)  20,069  0.089  0.073  0.064    0.045  0.042  0.031    0.044  0.031    <0.001  <0.001 
Country Characteristics                             
  ICR Political Index  20,069  78.622  82.200  8.570    82.082  82.143  1.362    -3.460  0.057    <0.001  <0.001 
  ICR Political Risk - Stability  20,069  56.895  58.000  5.262    57.235  56.929  1.678    -0.341  1.071    <0.001  <0.001 
  ICR Political Risk - Law & Order  20,069  21.727  22.208  3.836    24.847  25.188  0.687    -3.120  -2.979    <0.001  <0.001 
  Creditor Rights  20,056  2.276  2.000  0.994    1.000  1.000  0.000    1.276  1.000    <0.001  <0.001 
  Anti-Selfdealing Index  20,069  0.611  0.560  0.226    0.650  0.650  0.000    -0.039  -0.090    <0.001  <0.001 
  Stock Market Turnover Ratio  20,069  0.922  0.806  0.526    1.475  1.506  0.205    -0.553  -0.699    <0.001  <0.001 
  Total External Capital (% GDP)  20,069  2.735  2.878  1.192    4.593  4.680  0.281    -1.858  -1.802    <0.001  <0.001 
  Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  20,069  1.010  0.798  0.742    1.307  1.316  0.100    -0.297  -0.517    <0.001  <0.001 
  Bank Private Credit (% GDP)  17,480  1.039  1.058  0.386    0.527  0.524  0.027    0.513  0.534    <0.001  <0.001 
  Bank & Other Private Credit (% GDP)  17,487  1.114  1.164  0.405    1.732  1.770  0.138    -0.618  -0.607    <0.001  <0.001 
  Private Bond Capital (% GDP)  20,069  0.295  0.280  0.185    1.076  1.103  0.086    -0.781  -0.824    <0.001  <0.001 
  Public Bond Capital (% GDP)  20,069  0.460  0.338  0.351    0.467  0.462  0.025    -0.007  -0.124    0.005  <0.001 
  GDP per Capita  20,004  0.021  0.025  0.013    0.038  0.039  0.004    -0.017  -0.014    <0.001  <0.001 
  Disclosure Index  19,923  5.476  5.553  0.742    6.553  6.553  0.000    -1.076  -1.000    <0.001  <0.001 
  Domestic Market Volatility (log)  18,868  -1.639  -1.630  0.279     -2.028  -2.032  0.188     0.389  0.402     <0.001  <0.001   30 
Table 2: Matched Sample Tests of Risk Measures 
 
This table reports mean, median, and standard deviation (Std.Dev.) values for risk characteristics of Non-U.S. firms and matched U.S. firms. Annual values for each Non-U.S. 
firm (and its matched U.S. firm(s)) are averaged so that each Non-U.S. firm appears only once in each panel. Variables are created using USD-denominated data. Matching is 
performed one year prior to the observation year by industry. p-values from t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for differences in samples are reported in the last two columns. Panel 
A reports values for all firms. Panel B reports differences by different screens for trading activity (i.e., percent of returns equal to zero). Panel C reports values for unlevered 
risk measures using four alternative leverage measures: 
  1. (Total Debt + Preferred Stock) / (Year-End Market Capitalization + Total Debt + Preferred Stock) 
  2. (Total Debt + Preferred Stock) / (Total Assets – Total Common Equity + Year End Market Capitalization) 
  3. (Total Debt + Preferred Stock) / (Total Debt + Preferred Stock + Total Common Equity) 
  4. Total Debt / (Total Debt + Preferred Stock + Year End Market Capitalization) 
 
Panel A: Differences in Risk Measures 
 
         Non-U.S. Firms     Matched U.S. Firms     Differences     p-values 
   N     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Means  Medians     t-Test  Wilcoxon 
All Countries                               
  Total Risk  20,069    0.490  0.442  0.212    0.497  0.480  0.169    -0.007  -0.038    <0.001  <0.001 
  Systematic risk  20,065    0.201  0.185  0.094    0.172  0.165  0.064    0.029  0.020    <0.001  <0.001 
  Idiosyncratic Risk  20,065    0.436  0.387  0.205    0.460  0.442  0.162    -0.024  -0.055    <0.001  <0.001 
  R
2  20,065    0.211  0.187  0.122    0.153  0.148  0.066    0.057  0.039    <0.001  <0.001 
                               
Developed Countries Only                               
  Total Risk  12,967    0.494  0.436  0.232    0.503  0.484  0.174    -0.008  -0.048    <0.001  <0.001 
  Systematic risk  12,963    0.191  0.177  0.084    0.175  0.167  0.067    0.015  0.010    <0.001  <0.001 
  Idiosyncratic Risk  12,963    0.446  0.386  0.227    0.464  0.445  0.166    -0.018  -0.059    <0.001  <0.001 
  R
2  12,963    0.198  0.174  0.113    0.155  0.151  0.065    0.043  0.023    <0.001  <0.001 
                               
Emerging Countries Only                               
  Total Risk  7,564    0.487  0.450  0.178    0.486  0.471  0.163    0.001  -0.020    0.774  0.002 
  Systematic risk  7,563    0.222  0.204  0.111    0.166  0.160  0.062    0.056  0.044    <0.001  <0.001 
  Idiosyncratic Risk  7,563    0.419  0.389  0.161    0.450  0.436  0.158    -0.031  -0.047    <0.001  <0.001 
  R
2  7,563    0.238  0.218  0.138    0.150  0.142  0.069    0.088  0.076    <0.001  <0.001 
                                               
(continued) 
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Table 2: Matched Sample Tests of Risk Measures (continued) 
 
Panel B: Differences in Risk Measures by Zero Return Thresholds 
 
         Non-U.S. Firms     Matched U.S. Firms     Differences     p-values 
   N     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Means  Medians     t-Test  Wilcoxon 
Total Risk                               
  No Zero Returns Screen  21,305    0.497  0.447  0.221    0.522  0.502  0.173    -0.024  -0.055    <0.001  <0.001 
  <30% Zero Returns Threshold  20,069    0.490  0.442  0.212    0.497  0.480  0.169    -0.007  -0.038    <0.001  <0.001 
  <10% Zero Returns Threshold  17,488    0.476  0.433  0.204    0.476  0.453  0.169    0.000  -0.021    0.857  <0.001 
                               
Systematic risk                               
  No Zero Returns Screen  21,302    0.196  0.182  0.089    0.170  0.165  0.060    0.026  0.017    <0.001  <0.001 
  <30% Zero Returns Threshold  20,065    0.201  0.185  0.094    0.172  0.165  0.064    0.029  0.020    <0.001  <0.001 
  <10% Zero Returns Threshold  17,486    0.207  0.191  0.101    0.177  0.168  0.073    0.030  0.023    <0.001  <0.001 
                               
Idiosyncratic Risk                               
  No Zero Returns Screen  21,302    0.445  0.394  0.215    0.486  0.466  0.168    -0.041  -0.072    <0.001  <0.001 
  <30% Zero Returns Threshold  20,065    0.436  0.387  0.205    0.460  0.442  0.162    -0.024  -0.055    <0.001  <0.001 
  <10% Zero Returns Threshold  17,486    0.417  0.374  0.193    0.435  0.414  0.159    -0.018  -0.040    <0.001  <0.001 
                               
R
2                               
  No Zero Returns Screen  21,302    0.202  0.174  0.120    0.141  0.136  0.063    0.061  0.038    <0.001  <0.001 
  <30% Zero Returns Threshold  20,065    0.211  0.187  0.122    0.153  0.148  0.066    0.057  0.039    <0.001  <0.001 
  <10% Zero Returns Threshold  17,486     0.229  0.210  0.128     0.170  0.163  0.077     0.060  0.047     <0.001  <0.001 
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Table 2: Matched Sample Tests of Risk Measures (continued) 
 
Panel C: Differences in Alternative Unlevered Risk Measures 
 
         Non-U.S. Firms     Matched U.S. Firms     Differences     p-values 
   N     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Means  Medians     t-Test  Wilcoxon 
Total Risk                               
  Raw  20,069    0.490  0.442  0.212    0.497  0.480  0.169    -0.007  -0.038    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 1  20,069    0.357  0.305  0.208    0.373  0.351  0.159    -0.016  -0.046    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 2  19,736    0.395  0.342  0.202    0.404  0.381  0.158    -0.009  -0.039    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 3  19,737    0.336  0.286  0.206    0.350  0.327  0.164    -0.013  -0.042    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 4  20,069    0.359  0.306  0.208    0.381  0.357  0.163    -0.022  -0.051    <0.001  <0.001 
                               
Systematic risk                               
  Raw  20,065    0.201  0.185  0.094    0.172  0.165  0.064    0.029  0.020    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 1  20,065    0.145  0.129  0.081    0.131  0.122  0.062    0.014  0.006    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 2  19,732    0.162  0.146  0.083    0.143  0.133  0.063    0.019  0.013    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 3  19,733    0.136  0.120  0.081    0.123  0.112  0.063    0.014  0.008    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 4  20,065    0.145  0.129  0.081    0.134  0.124  0.063    0.012  0.005    <0.001  <0.001 
                               
Idiosyncratic Risk                               
  Raw  20,065    0.436  0.387  0.205    0.460  0.442  0.162    -0.024  -0.055    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 1  20,065    0.318  0.267  0.199    0.344  0.323  0.150    -0.026  -0.056    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 2  19,732    0.351  0.298  0.193    0.372  0.351  0.149    -0.021  -0.052    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 3  19,733    0.300  0.249  0.196    0.323  0.302  0.154    -0.023  -0.053    <0.001  <0.001 
  Unlevered 4  20,065     0.320  0.268  0.199     0.351  0.329  0.154     -0.032  -0.062     <0.001  <0.001 
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Table 3: Matched Sample Tests over Time 
This table reports mean, median, and standard deviation (Std.Dev.) values for risk characteristics of Non-U.S. firms and matched U.S. firms by year. Variables are 
created using U.S. dollar denominated data. Firms with more than 30% of local currency stock returns equal to zero in the previous year are excluded. Matching is 
performed one year prior to the observation year by industry. p-values from t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for differences in samples are reported in the last column. 
            Non-U.S. Firms     U.S. Firms     Differences     p-values 
   Year  N     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Means  Medians     t-Test  Wilcoxon 
Total Risk  1991  2,889    0.342  0.318  0.132    0.388  0.348  0.171    -0.046  -0.030    <0.001  <0.001 
  1992  3,316    0.403  0.382  0.158    0.361  0.329  0.149    0.042  0.053    <0.001  <0.001 
  1993  3,584    0.375  0.350  0.146    0.348  0.315  0.152    0.027  0.035    <0.001  <0.001 
  1994  4,114    0.344  0.311  0.167    0.326  0.293  0.140    0.018  0.018    <0.001  <0.001 
  1995  4,723    0.350  0.328  0.141    0.343  0.299  0.175    0.007  0.029    0.031  <0.001 
  1996  5,372    0.326  0.289  0.146    0.354  0.304  0.173    -0.028  -0.015    <0.001  <0.001 
  1997  6,246    0.480  0.427  0.235    0.366  0.322  0.166    0.114  0.105    <0.001  <0.001 
  1998  6,996    0.621  0.537  0.332    0.500  0.452  0.231    0.121  0.085    <0.001  <0.001 
  1999  8,077    0.528  0.477  0.242    0.531  0.469  0.270    -0.003  0.008    0.518  0.013 
  2000  9,630    0.549  0.488  0.263    0.643  0.549  0.348    -0.093  -0.062    <0.001  <0.001 
  2001  11,503    0.556  0.485  0.289    0.653  0.574  0.354    -0.097  -0.089    <0.001  <0.001 
  2002  12,634    0.507  0.444  0.270    0.600  0.518  0.332    -0.092  -0.075    <0.001  <0.001 
  2003  14,096    0.455  0.392  0.244    0.512  0.437  0.283    -0.058  -0.046    <0.001  <0.001 
  2004  15,071    0.412  0.362  0.207    0.455  0.393  0.240    -0.042  -0.031    <0.001  <0.001 
  2005  16,552    0.399  0.350  0.206    0.427  0.379  0.216    -0.028  -0.028    <0.001  <0.001 
  2006  17,470    0.430  0.387  0.203    0.422  0.383  0.202    0.009  0.004    <0.001  <0.001 
                                 
Systematic risk  1991  2,887    0.179  0.173  0.074    0.165  0.158  0.083    0.014  0.016    <0.001  <0.001 
  1992  3,311    0.230  0.211  0.110    0.123  0.117  0.063    0.107  0.094    <0.001  <0.001 
  1993  3,567    0.198  0.188  0.088    0.109  0.099  0.055    0.089  0.090    <0.001  <0.001 
  1994  4,114    0.175  0.154  0.113    0.122  0.115  0.059    0.053  0.039    <0.001  <0.001 
  1995  4,723    0.170  0.153  0.092    0.095  0.080  0.058    0.076  0.073    <0.001  <0.001 
  1996  5,372    0.137  0.126  0.073    0.110  0.100  0.059    0.027  0.025    <0.001  <0.001 
  1997  6,246    0.244  0.196  0.187    0.119  0.108  0.062    0.125  0.088    <0.001  <0.001 
  1998  6,996    0.363  0.292  0.270    0.222  0.206  0.115    0.142  0.085    <0.001  <0.001 
  1999  8,077    0.215  0.182  0.143    0.150  0.130  0.094    0.065  0.051    <0.001  <0.001 
  2000  9,630    0.219  0.181  0.142    0.225  0.165  0.182    -0.005  0.016    0.026  <0.001 
  2001  11,503    0.264  0.227  0.173    0.264  0.229  0.169    -0.001  -0.002    0.785  0.853 
  2002  12,634    0.213  0.186  0.127    0.201  0.174  0.127    0.011  0.012    <0.001  <0.001 
  2003  14,094    0.180  0.158  0.107    0.174  0.153  0.111    0.006  0.005    <0.001  <0.001 
  2004  15,070    0.182  0.165  0.092    0.166  0.145  0.097    0.016  0.020    <0.001  <0.001 
  2005  16,551    0.149  0.134  0.078    0.145  0.132  0.077    0.004  0.001    <0.001  <0.001 
   2006  17,457     0.193  0.178  0.094     0.156  0.149  0.083     0.037  0.029     <0.001  <0.001 
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Table 3: Matched Sample Tests over Time (continued) 
 
            Non-U.S. Firms     U.S. Firms     Differences     p-values 
   Year  N     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Mean  Median  Std.Dev.     Means  Medians     t-Test  Wilcoxon 
Idiosyncratic Risk  1991  2,887    0.283  0.258  0.127    0.345  0.310  0.165    -0.062  -0.052    <0.001  <0.001 
  1992  3,311    0.318  0.293  0.144    0.336  0.308  0.144    -0.018  -0.015    <0.001  <0.001 
  1993  3,567    0.307  0.277  0.141    0.327  0.282  0.150    -0.020  -0.005    <0.001  <0.001 
  1994  4,114    0.286  0.255  0.144    0.298  0.267  0.136    -0.012  -0.012    <0.001  <0.001 
  1995  4,723    0.296  0.273  0.132    0.327  0.283  0.171    -0.031  -0.011    <0.001  <0.001 
  1996  5,372    0.289  0.255  0.142    0.332  0.289  0.172    -0.043  -0.035    <0.001  <0.001 
  1997  6,246    0.396  0.360  0.187    0.342  0.298  0.164    0.054  0.062    <0.001  <0.001 
  1998  6,996    0.479  0.416  0.248    0.440  0.387  0.218    0.039  0.029    <0.001  <0.001 
  1999  8,077    0.470  0.422  0.223    0.504  0.442  0.263    -0.034  -0.020    <0.001  <0.001 
  2000  9,630    0.493  0.433  0.245    0.593  0.508  0.314    -0.100  -0.075    <0.001  <0.001 
  2001  11,503    0.472  0.403  0.265    0.585  0.506  0.334    -0.112  -0.103    <0.001  <0.001 
  2002  12,634    0.448  0.376  0.261    0.556  0.475  0.321    -0.109  -0.099    <0.001  <0.001 
  2003  14,094    0.408  0.342  0.236    0.474  0.400  0.275    -0.065  -0.058    <0.001  <0.001 
  2004  15,070    0.360  0.311  0.203    0.416  0.356  0.233    -0.056  -0.045    <0.001  <0.001 
  2005  16,551    0.363  0.314  0.203    0.396  0.350  0.213    -0.033  -0.036    <0.001  <0.001 
  2006  17,457    0.376  0.328  0.200    0.387  0.343  0.199    -0.011  -0.015    <0.001  <0.001 
                                 
R
2  1991  2,887    0.317  0.306  0.168    0.216  0.209  0.136    0.101  0.097    <0.001  <0.001 
  1992  3,311    0.361  0.358  0.192    0.138  0.116  0.093    0.224  0.242    <0.001  <0.001 
  1993  3,567    0.326  0.313  0.184    0.125  0.104  0.095    0.201  0.209    <0.001  <0.001 
  1994  4,114    0.289  0.266  0.174    0.168  0.148  0.112    0.121  0.118    <0.001  <0.001 
  1995  4,723    0.277  0.247  0.179    0.096  0.077  0.080    0.181  0.170    <0.001  <0.001 
  1996  5,372    0.218  0.187  0.154    0.135  0.098  0.121    0.083  0.089    <0.001  <0.001 
  1997  6,246    0.271  0.228  0.198    0.142  0.106  0.117    0.129  0.123    <0.001  <0.001 
  1998  6,996    0.348  0.330  0.214    0.225  0.206  0.137    0.123  0.125    <0.001  <0.001 
  1999  8,077    0.191  0.145  0.158    0.100  0.074  0.086    0.091  0.071    <0.001  <0.001 
  2000  9,630    0.185  0.147  0.148    0.128  0.098  0.105    0.057  0.049    <0.001  <0.001 
  2001  11,503    0.262  0.228  0.181    0.199  0.164  0.144    0.063  0.063    <0.001  <0.001 
  2002  12,634    0.224  0.183  0.169    0.148  0.117  0.121    0.076  0.067    <0.001  <0.001 
  2003  14,094    0.199  0.164  0.152    0.160  0.121  0.136    0.039  0.043    <0.001  <0.001 
  2004  15,070    0.251  0.217  0.170    0.172  0.144  0.126    0.079  0.073    <0.001  <0.001 
  2005  16,551    0.188  0.152  0.142    0.156  0.117  0.130    0.031  0.035    <0.001  <0.001 
   2006  17,457     0.255  0.228  0.167     0.175  0.149  0.131     0.080  0.079     <0.001  <0.001   35 
Table 4: Correlations 
 
This table reports correlations (x100) between variables at the country level. Country-level estimates are medians across available years. For risk variables, country medians 
are used to obtain country-level values prior to taking the median across years. Asterisks (*, **, ***) denote values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% confidence levels, respectively. Firms with more than 30% of local currency stock returns equal to zero in the previous year are excluded. Variable definitions are 





















































ICR Political Risk - 
Law & Order  84.4 ***                                           
Creditor Rights Index  15.1   26.2                                         
Anti-Self-Dealing 
Index  -2.0   13.1   45.2 ***                                     
Stock Market 
Turnover Ratio  -6.3   -1.5   6.5   0.1                                   
Stock Market Capital 
(% GDP)  37.6 ***  41.7 ***  34.5 **  45.6 ***  -3.0                                
Bank Private Credit 
(% GDP)  56.4 ***  62.0 ***  48.0 ***  36.4 **  6.9   66.8 ***                            
Bank & Other Private 
Credit (% GDP)  58.2 ***  62.1 ***  48.1 ***  38.1 ***  12.3   69.5 ***  94.7 ***                         
Private Bond Capital 
(% GDP)  52.6 ***  48.2 ***  23.3   0.6   18.5   26.4   43.6 ***  49.1 ***                      
Public Bond Capital 
(% GDP)  38.7 ***  35.0 **  -0.4   -8.0   6.9   3.7   21.4   22.1   48.7 ***                   
GDP per Capita  74.8 ***  79.4 ***  24.6   0.5   0.0   48.2 ***  66.6 ***  66.4 ***  57.4 ***  32.9 **                
Disclosure Index  66.7 ***  85.2 ***  22.3   23.5   6.6   51.0 ***  56.9 ***  58.9 ***  50.2 ***  37.8 ***  77.1 ***             
Domestic Market 
Index Volatility  -49.5 ***  -62.1 ***  -6.8   -26.0   21.5   -37.8 ***  -55.1 ***  -52.8 ***  -39.2 ***  -27.5   -52.6 ***  -60.9 ***          
Total Risk   -49.9 ***  -61.1 ***  -7.1   -12.6   25.8   -26.0   -49.2 ***  -44.4 ***  -35.4 **  -23.8   -47.8 ***  -55.3 ***  85.0 ***       
Systematic risk  -60.0 ***  -64.4 ***  -5.3   -19.4   14.3   -31.4 **  -55.9 ***  -53.3 ***  -41.5 ***  -23.9   -52.1 ***  -51.4 ***  83.5 ***  83.0 ***    
Idiosyncratic Risk  -41.7 ***  -54.1 ***  -2.9    -2.9    31.1 **  -13.3    -38.3 ***  -32.5 **  -27.1    -20.4    -40.9 ***  -52.4 ***  70.7 ***  94.1 ***  65.1 *** 
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Table 5: Country-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
This table reports results from Fama-MacBeth-style regressions. Risk variables are measured as the country median of log differences between non-U.S. firms and their 
matching U.S. firms. Regressions are estimated at the country-level annually with lagged independent variables listed in the first column. Using these estimated coefficients a 
second regression determines the relation over time (1992-2006), and these values are reported in the table with corresponding p-values in brackets (values reported as [0.00] 
are less than 0.005). Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) procedure. Explanatory variables are lagged and standardized to mean zero and unit standard 
deviation so that the intercept provides a test of the difference in risk between non-U.S. and U.S. firms, and the magnitude of coefficients represents the effect on risk of a one 
standard deviation move in the explanatory variable. Firms with more than 30% of local currency stock returns equal to zero in the previous period are excluded. Observations 
is the average number of countries each year in the cross-sectional regressions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Panel A: Total Risk 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.130  [0.00]                                     
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order     -0.147  [0.00]                                 
Creditor Rights Index         -0.002  [0.81]                             
Anti-Self-Dealing Index             -0.012  [0.21]                         
Stock Market Turnover Ratio                  0.040  [0.00]                     
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)                     -0.019  [0.11]                 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                         -0.078  [0.00]             
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                       -0.094 [0.00]       
GDP per Capita                          -0.125 [0.00]    
Disclosure Index                                     -0.136  [0.00] 
Intercept  -0.021  [0.60] -0.021  [0.60] -0.021  [0.60] -0.021  [0.60] -0.021  [0.60] -0.021  [0.60] -0.022  [0.57] -0.022  [0.57] -0.021  [0.60] -0.021  [0.60] 
Adjusted R
2  0.186    0.245   -0.009   -0.010    0.005    0.000    0.074    0.093    0.196    0.233   
Observations (average per year)  40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.0     40.0     40.8     40.8    
                                                              
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.073  [0.00]         -0.074  [0.00]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order     -0.084  [0.00]         -0.077  [0.00]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.002  [0.87]  0.014  [0.22]                 -0.003  [0.74]  0.001  [0.92] -0.002  [0.83]  0.003  [0.82] 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index          0.030  [0.00]  0.002  [0.80]  0.017  [0.06]  0.004  [0.68]  0.023  [0.01]  0.035  [0.00]  0.024  [0.02]  0.026  [0.03] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  0.000  [0.98]  0.012  [0.34]  0.000  [0.98]          0.007  [0.54]  0.000  [0.98]  0.017  [0.18]  0.017  [0.15]  0.017  [0.23] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  0.025  [0.02]  0.024  [0.01]      0.024  [0.02]  0.018  [0.07]  0.023  [0.01]  0.023  [0.03]  0.030  [0.01]  0.024  [0.01]  0.029  [0.01] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                             -0.023  [0.03]     -0.016  [0.18] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                 -0.028  [0.00] -0.024  [0.01] 
GDP per Capita                     -0.061  [0.00]                 
Disclosure Index         -0.060  [0.00]             -0.064  [0.00] -0.072  [0.00] -0.062  [0.01] -0.062  [0.02] 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  0.173  [0.00]  0.158  [0.00]  0.168  [0.00]  0.169  [0.00]  0.161  [0.00]  0.171  [0.00]  0.173  [0.00]  0.160  [0.00]  0.166  [0.00]  0.161  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  0.039  [0.00]  0.030  [0.00]  0.028  [0.02]  0.039  [0.00]  0.035  [0.00]  0.032  [0.01]  0.026  [0.01]  0.028  [0.00]  0.031  [0.00]  0.034  [0.00] 
Intercept  -0.021  [0.58] -0.021  [0.58] -0.021  [0.59] -0.021  [0.59] -0.021  [0.59] -0.021  [0.58] -0.021  [0.55] -0.022  [0.52] -0.022  [0.52] -0.022  [0.60] 
Adjusted R
2  0.456    0.455    0.446    0.448    0.446    0.438    0.440    0.449    0.444    0.443   
Observations (average per year)  40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.0     40.0     40.0    
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Table 5: Country-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions (continued) 
Panel B: Systematic risk 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.217  [0.00]                                     
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order     -0.241  [0.00]                                 
Creditor Rights Index         -0.004  [0.73]                             
Anti-Self-Dealing Index             -0.043  [0.02]                         
Stock Market Turnover Ratio                 -0.001  [0.96]                     
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)                     -0.066  [0.00]                 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                         -0.158  [0.00]             
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                       -0.179 [0.00]       
GDP per Capita                          -0.210 [0.00]    
Disclosure Index                                     -0.214  [0.00] 
Intercept  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.302  [0.00]  0.302  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00] 
Adjusted R
2  0.231    0.287   -0.013    0.010   -0.016    0.021    0.137    0.150    0.218    0.228   
Observations (average per year)  40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.0     40.0     40.8     40.8    
                                                              
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.105  [0.00]         -0.111  [0.00]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order     -0.112  [0.00]         -0.108  [0.00]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.022  [0.18]  0.038  [0.03]                  0.028  [0.17]  0.033  [0.02]  0.030  [0.05]  0.038  [0.05] 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index          0.021  [0.10] -0.018  [0.36]  0.001  [0.95] -0.011  [0.51] -0.005  [0.78]  0.028  [0.22]  0.008  [0.69]  0.009  [0.73] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  -0.051  [0.00] -0.038  [0.03] -0.044  [0.01]         -0.038  [0.02] -0.055  [0.02] -0.008  [0.57] -0.011  [0.42] -0.008  [0.59] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  0.007  [0.73]  0.001  [0.97]      0.029  [0.13]  0.016  [0.38]  0.019  [0.24]  0.013  [0.53]  0.025  [0.17]  0.010  [0.47]  0.022  [0.25] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                             -0.048  [0.01]     -0.034  [0.07] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                 -0.061  [0.00] -0.055  [0.00] 
GDP per Capita                     -0.084  [0.00]                 
Disclosure Index         -0.073  [0.00]             -0.070  [0.00] -0.100  [0.00] -0.080  [0.01] -0.079  [0.02] 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  0.276  [0.00]  0.259  [0.00]  0.278  [0.00]  0.256  [0.00]  0.247  [0.00]  0.272  [0.00]  0.284  [0.00]  0.256  [0.00]  0.264  [0.00]  0.255  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  0.030  [0.13]  0.013  [0.46]  0.003  [0.90]  0.020  [0.34]  0.007  [0.69]  0.014  [0.34]  0.002  [0.88]  0.010  [0.47]  0.017  [0.14]  0.023  [0.09] 
Intercept  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.296  [0.00]  0.302  [0.00]  0.302  [0.00]  0.302  [0.00] 
Adjusted R
2  0.524    0.510    0.480    0.510    0.494    0.480    0.491    0.540    0.543    0.543   
Observations (average per year)  40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.0     40.0     40.0    
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Table 5: Country-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions (continued) 
Panel C: Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.089  [0.00]                                     
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order     -0.102  [0.00]                                 
Creditor Rights Index          0.000  [0.96]                             
Anti-Self-Dealing Index              0.000  [0.99]                         
Stock Market Turnover Ratio                  0.054  [0.00]                     
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)                      0.002  [0.86]                 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                         -0.037  [0.01]             
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                       -0.056 [0.00]       
GDP per Capita                          -0.085 [0.00]    
Disclosure Index                                     -0.093  [0.00] 
Intercept  -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.130  [0.00] -0.130  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] 
Adjusted R
2  0.131    0.159   -0.002   -0.016    0.031    0.006    0.033    0.048    0.151    0.172   
Observations (average per year)  40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.0     40.0     40.8     40.8    
                                                              
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.063  [0.00]         -0.060  [0.00]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order     -0.071  [0.00]         -0.063  [0.00]                     
Creditor Rights Index  -0.007  [0.52]  0.003  [0.72]                 -0.020  [0.08] -0.018  [0.17] -0.019  [0.16] -0.016  [0.22] 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index          0.038  [0.00]  0.017  [0.02]  0.029  [0.00]  0.016  [0.01]  0.043  [0.00]  0.048  [0.00]  0.040  [0.00]  0.042  [0.00] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  0.020  [0.12]  0.030  [0.02]  0.017  [0.17]          0.024  [0.08]  0.021  [0.09]  0.028  [0.02]  0.030  [0.01]  0.028  [0.04] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  0.032  [0.00]  0.033  [0.00]      0.018  [0.08]  0.014  [0.17]  0.022  [0.01]  0.025  [0.00]  0.029  [0.01]  0.026  [0.00]  0.028  [0.01] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                             -0.011  [0.21]     -0.005  [0.65] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                 -0.020  [0.00] -0.019  [0.02] 
GDP per Capita                     -0.055  [0.00]                 
Disclosure Index         -0.048  [0.01]             -0.054  [0.00] -0.056  [0.01] -0.047  [0.02] -0.050  [0.02] 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  0.117  [0.00]  0.105  [0.00]  0.115  [0.00]  0.119  [0.00]  0.113  [0.00]  0.115  [0.00]  0.120  [0.00]  0.113  [0.00]  0.116  [0.00]  0.113  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  0.047  [0.00]  0.042  [0.00]  0.044  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.050  [0.00]  0.046  [0.00]  0.042  [0.00]  0.041  [0.00]  0.044  [0.00]  0.046  [0.00] 
Intercept  -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.127  [0.00] -0.130  [0.00] -0.130  [0.00] -0.130  [0.00] 
Adjusted R
2  0.334    0.328    0.325    0.309    0.305    0.329    0.332    0.315    0.308    0.302   
Observations (average per year)  40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.0     40.0     40.0    
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Table 6: Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
This table reports values from Fama-MacBeth style regressions using firm-level observations with different measures of risk as the dependent variables (listed in panel 
headings). Risk variables are measured as log differences between non-U.S. firms and their matching U.S. firms. Regressions are estimated at the firm-level annually with the 
independent variables listed in the first column. Using these estimated coefficients a second regression determines the relation over time (1992-2006), and these values are 
reported in the table with corresponding p-values in brackets (values reported as [0.00] are less than 0.005). Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) 
procedure. Explanatory variables are lagged and standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation so that the intercept provides a test of the difference in risk between 
non-U.S. and U.S. firms, and the magnitude of coefficients represents the effect on risk of a one standard deviation move in the explanatory variable. Firms with more than 
30% of local currency stock returns equal to zero in the previous are excluded. Observations is the average number of firms each year in the cross-sectional regressions. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Panel A: Total Risk 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.052  [0.00]          -0.049  [0.00]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order      -0.071  [0.01]          -0.064  [0.02]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.002  [0.90]  0.009  [0.49]                  0.003  [0.74]  0.006  [0.45]  -0.003  [0.75]  0.003  [0.70] 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index          0.033  [0.00]  -0.011  [0.43]  -0.006  [0.65]  -0.019  [0.17]  0.001  [0.92]  0.006  [0.60]  0.002  [0.89]  -0.005  [0.76] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  0.012  [0.36]  0.020  [0.14]  0.008  [0.66]          0.012  [0.42]  0.005  [0.78]  0.018  [0.19]  0.023  [0.09]  0.021  [0.06] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  0.042  [0.01]  0.039  [0.00]      0.052  [0.01]  0.047  [0.01]  0.051  [0.00]  0.042  [0.01]  0.048  [0.00]  0.039  [0.01]  0.047  [0.01] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                              -0.028  [0.06]      -0.023  [0.12] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                  -0.030  [0.00]  -0.028  [0.00] 
GDP per Capita                      -0.081  [0.00]                 
Disclosure Index          -0.045  [0.15]              -0.049  [0.09]  -0.058  [0.01]  -0.050  [0.02]  -0.046  [0.05] 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  0.106  [0.00]  0.088  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.110  [0.00]  0.094  [0.00]  0.094  [0.00]  0.098  [0.00]  0.088  [0.00]  0.092  [0.00]  0.092  [0.00] 
PPE (% Total Assets)  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.083  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00] 
Gross Profit Margin ( 3 yr. avg.)  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.089  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.088  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00] 
Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  0.049  [0.00]  0.050  [0.00]  0.048  [0.00]  0.048  [0.00]  0.049  [0.00]  0.055  [0.00]  0.047  [0.00]  0.053  [0.00]  0.053  [0.00]  0.055  [0.00] 
Debt Maturity   -0.055  [0.00]  -0.053  [0.00]  -0.054  [0.00]  -0.055  [0.00]  -0.054  [0.00]  -0.053  [0.00]  -0.054  [0.00]  -0.055  [0.00]  -0.056  [0.00]  -0.055  [0.00] 
R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  0.092  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.092  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.092  [0.00]  0.092  [0.00]  0.091  [0.00]  0.091  [0.00]  0.091  [0.00] 
Capital Expend. (%Total Assets)  0.061  [0.00]  0.060  [0.00]  0.059  [0.00]  0.061  [0.00]  0.061  [0.00]  0.057  [0.00]  0.060  [0.00]  0.058  [0.00]  0.060  [0.00]  0.058  [0.00] 
Percent Zero Returns  0.042  [0.00]  0.043  [0.00]  0.046  [0.00]  0.041  [0.00]  0.041  [0.00]  0.043  [0.00]  0.045  [0.00]  0.044  [0.00]  0.045  [0.00]  0.044  [0.00] 
Leverage  0.109  [0.00]  0.109  [0.00]  0.102  [0.00]  0.110  [0.00]  0.112  [0.00]  0.111  [0.00]  0.104  [0.00]  0.108  [0.00]  0.106  [0.00]  0.109  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  -0.009  [0.55]  -0.020  [0.19]  -0.025  [0.07]  -0.013  [0.37]  -0.022  [0.13]  0.003  [0.85]  -0.032  [0.01]  -0.023  [0.04]  -0.024  [0.02]  -0.012  [0.19] 
Intercept  -0.022  [0.62]  -0.022  [0.62]  -0.022  [0.61]  -0.022  [0.61]  -0.022  [0.61]  -0.022  [0.62]  -0.022  [0.63]  -0.020  [0.65]  -0.020  [0.65]  -0.020  [0.61] 
Adjusted R
2  0.211    0.218    0.210    0.204    0.212    0.219    0.216    0.226    0.222    0.228   
Observations (average per year)  5117.3     5117.3     5117.3     5117.3     5117.3     5117.3     5117.3     4800.6     4800.6     4800.6    
(continued) 
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Table 6: Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions (continued) 
 
Panel B: Systematic risk 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.056  [0.00]          -0.055  [0.00]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order      -0.095  [0.00]          -0.095  [0.00]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.040  [0.05]  0.050  [0.02]                  0.057  [0.01]  0.052  [0.00]  0.043  [0.01]  0.051  [0.00] 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index          0.041  [0.02]  -0.020  [0.39]  -0.017  [0.46]  -0.032  [0.12]  -0.042  [0.16]  -0.011  [0.66]  -0.021  [0.45]  -0.023  [0.45] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  -0.053  [0.00]  -0.047  [0.01]  -0.053  [0.03]          -0.049  [0.02]  -0.076  [0.00]  -0.053  [0.00]  -0.049  [0.00]  -0.052  [0.00] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  0.034  [0.25]  0.029  [0.24]      0.079  [0.06]  0.075  [0.06]  0.073  [0.04]  0.056  [0.15]  0.053  [0.11]  0.045  [0.19]  0.051  [0.13] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                              -0.034  [0.10]      -0.028  [0.15] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                  -0.036  [0.01]  -0.030  [0.02] 
GDP per Capita                      -0.095  [0.00]                 
Disclosure Index          -0.058  [0.15]              -0.062  [0.08]  -0.105  [0.00]  -0.095  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.01] 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  0.215  [0.00]  0.184  [0.00]  0.194  [0.00]  0.203  [0.00]  0.172  [0.00]  0.198  [0.00]  0.205  [0.00]  0.186  [0.00]  0.191  [0.00]  0.190  [0.00] 
PPE (% Total Assets)  -0.082  [0.00]  -0.082  [0.00]  -0.077  [0.00]  -0.081  [0.00]  -0.082  [0.00]  -0.079  [0.00]  -0.082  [0.00]  -0.082  [0.00]  -0.083  [0.00]  -0.082  [0.00] 
Gross Profit Margin ( 3 yr. avg.)  -0.061  [0.00]  -0.063  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.058  [0.00]  -0.059  [0.00]  -0.057  [0.00]  -0.064  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.066  [0.00] 
Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  0.047  [0.00]  0.049  [0.00]  0.045  [0.00]  0.044  [0.00]  0.047  [0.00]  0.054  [0.00]  0.044  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.050  [0.00]  0.052  [0.00] 
Debt Maturity   -0.009  [0.12]  -0.006  [0.29]  -0.009  [0.04]  -0.008  [0.02]  -0.006  [0.12]  -0.010  [0.02]  -0.008  [0.04]  -0.012  [0.01]  -0.012  [0.01]  -0.011  [0.00] 
R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  0.088  [0.00]  0.089  [0.00]  0.087  [0.00]  0.089  [0.00]  0.089  [0.00]  0.086  [0.00]  0.087  [0.00]  0.085  [0.00]  0.085  [0.00]  0.086  [0.00] 
Capital Expend. (%Total Assets)  0.039  [0.01]  0.037  [0.01]  0.037  [0.02]  0.038  [0.00]  0.037  [0.00]  0.035  [0.02]  0.039  [0.00]  0.038  [0.01]  0.040  [0.00]  0.038  [0.00] 
Percent Zero Returns  -0.106  [0.00]  -0.105  [0.00]  -0.102  [0.00]  -0.100  [0.00]  -0.101  [0.00]  -0.104  [0.00]  -0.104  [0.00]  -0.107  [0.00]  -0.105  [0.00]  -0.107  [0.00] 
Leverage  0.063  [0.00]  0.063  [0.00]  0.053  [0.00]  0.059  [0.00]  0.062  [0.00]  0.066  [0.00]  0.057  [0.00]  0.055  [0.00]  0.054  [0.00]  0.057  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  0.013  [0.66]  -0.002  [0.95]  0.000  [0.99]  0.005  [0.81]  -0.007  [0.73]  0.024  [0.36]  -0.023  [0.22]  -0.017  [0.21]  -0.017  [0.21]  -0.004  [0.73] 
Intercept  0.248  [0.01]  0.248  [0.01]  0.248  [0.01]  0.248  [0.01]  0.248  [0.01]  0.248  [0.01]  0.248  [0.01]  0.263  [0.00]  0.263  [0.00]  0.263  [0.00] 
Adjusted R
2  0.176    0.182    0.170    0.169    0.176    0.180    0.184    0.196    0.194    0.198   
Observations (average per year)  5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     4799.9     4799.9     4799.9    
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Table 6: Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions (continued) 
 
Panel C: Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.053  [0.00]          -0.046  [0.01]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order      -0.065  [0.01]          -0.055  [0.04]                     
Creditor Rights Index  -0.005  [0.72]  0.001  [0.95]                  -0.010  [0.32]  -0.007  [0.42]  -0.015  [0.24]  -0.010  [0.30] 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index          0.034  [0.00]  -0.002  [0.89]  0.003  [0.76]  -0.008  [0.53]  0.019  [0.00]  0.016  [0.08]  0.012  [0.09]  0.005  [0.69] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  0.032  [0.02]  0.041  [0.00]  0.028  [0.11]          0.033  [0.03]  0.031  [0.06]  0.041  [0.01]  0.045  [0.00]  0.044  [0.00] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  0.041  [0.00]  0.039  [0.00]      0.038  [0.01]  0.033  [0.01]  0.040  [0.00]  0.033  [0.00]  0.042  [0.00]  0.034  [0.00]  0.042  [0.00] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                              -0.024  [0.12]      -0.019  [0.17] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                  -0.028  [0.01]  -0.028  [0.00] 
GDP per Capita                      -0.076  [0.00]                 
Disclosure Index          -0.041  [0.15]              -0.045  [0.08]  -0.046  [0.03]  -0.038  [0.05]  -0.035  [0.07] 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  0.060  [0.00]  0.047  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.071  [0.00]  0.060  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.055  [0.00]  0.046  [0.00]  0.050  [0.00]  0.049  [0.00] 
PPE (% Total Assets)  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.088  [0.00]  -0.088  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00] 
Gross Profit Margin ( 3 yr. avg.)  -0.091  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.095  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.093  [0.00]  -0.091  [0.00]  -0.093  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.094  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00] 
Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  0.051  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.050  [0.00]  0.050  [0.00]  0.050  [0.00]  0.057  [0.00]  0.049  [0.00]  0.054  [0.00]  0.054  [0.00]  0.056  [0.00] 
Debt Maturity   -0.067  [0.00]  -0.066  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.068  [0.00]  -0.068  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.068  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00] 
R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  0.093  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.092  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.092  [0.00]  0.091  [0.00]  0.092  [0.00]  0.092  [0.00] 
Capital Expend. (%Total Assets)  0.066  [0.00]  0.066  [0.00]  0.064  [0.00]  0.067  [0.00]  0.068  [0.00]  0.063  [0.00]  0.065  [0.00]  0.064  [0.00]  0.065  [0.00]  0.064  [0.00] 
Percent Zero Returns  0.075  [0.00]  0.076  [0.00]  0.079  [0.00]  0.071  [0.00]  0.072  [0.00]  0.076  [0.00]  0.077  [0.00]  0.077  [0.00]  0.078  [0.00]  0.077  [0.00] 
Leverage  0.119  [0.00]  0.119  [0.00]  0.113  [0.00]  0.122  [0.00]  0.123  [0.00]  0.121  [0.00]  0.115  [0.00]  0.119  [0.00]  0.118  [0.00]  0.121  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  -0.014  [0.25]  -0.024  [0.04]  -0.029  [0.01]  -0.016  [0.16]  -0.024  [0.05]  -0.001  [0.92]  -0.032  [0.00]  -0.023  [0.04]  -0.026  [0.03]  -0.014  [0.19] 
Intercept  -0.098  [0.01]  -0.098  [0.01]  -0.098  [0.01]  -0.098  [0.01]  -0.098  [0.01]  -0.098  [0.01]  -0.098  [0.01]  -0.100  [0.01]  -0.100  [0.01]  -0.100  [0.00] 
Adjusted R
2  0.199    0.203    0.197    0.191    0.195    0.204    0.201    0.207    0.204    0.208   
Observations (average per year)  5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     4799.9     4799.9     4799.9      42 
Table 7: Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions with Changes in Variables 
This table reports values from Fama-MacBeth style regressions using changes in firm-level observations with different measures of risk as the dependent variables (listed in 
panel headings). Risk variables are measured as log differences between non-U.S. firms and their matching U.S. firms. Regressions are estimated at the firm-level annually 
with the independent variables listed in the first column. Using these estimated coefficients a second regression determines the relation over time (1993-2006), and these values 
are reported in the table with corresponding p-values in brackets (values reported as [0.00] are less than 0.005). Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West (1987) 
procedure. Explanatory variables are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation so that the intercept provides a test of the difference in risk between non-U.S. and 
U.S. firms, and the magnitude of coefficients represents the effect on risk of a one standard deviation move in the explanatory variable. Firms with more than 30% of local 
currency stock returns equal to zero in the previous are excluded. Observations is the average number of firms each year in the cross-sectional regressions. Variable definitions 
are provided in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Total Risk 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  0.024  [0.09]          0.020  [0.04]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order      0.005  [0.69]          0.007  [0.49]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.004  [0.25]  0.004  [0.05]                  0.005  [0.17]  0.002  [0.40]  0.006  [0.08]  0.005  [0.23] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  -0.009  [0.36]  -0.015  [0.07]  -0.006  [0.50]          -0.018  [0.08]  -0.016  [0.06]  -0.013  [0.08]  -0.013  [0.14]  -0.014  [0.12] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  0.000  [0.98]  0.007  [0.72]      0.001  [0.94]  0.005  [0.65]  0.001  [0.96]  0.003  [0.82]  0.002  [0.84]  -0.002  [0.84]  -0.003  [0.82] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                              0.007  [0.57]      0.001  [0.89] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                  0.024  [0.17]  0.021  [0.16] 
GDP per Capita                      -0.020  [0.14]                 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  -0.017  [0.33]  -0.018  [0.30]  -0.020  [0.23]  -0.020  [0.14]  -0.021  [0.13]  -0.019  [0.29]  -0.018  [0.14]  -0.025  [0.06]  -0.017  [0.32]  -0.018  [0.14] 
PPE (% Total Assets)  -0.090  [0.00]  -0.090  [0.00]  -0.090  [0.00]  -0.090  [0.00]  -0.091  [0.00]  -0.090  [0.00]  -0.090  [0.00]  -0.091  [0.00]  -0.091  [0.00]  -0.091  [0.00] 
Gross Profit Margin ( 3 yr. avg.)  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00] 
Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.079  [0.00]  0.080  [0.00]  0.080  [0.00] 
Debt Maturity   -0.058  [0.00]  -0.057  [0.00]  -0.058  [0.00]  -0.058  [0.00]  -0.058  [0.00]  -0.057  [0.00]  -0.058  [0.00]  -0.058  [0.00]  -0.058  [0.00]  -0.058  [0.00] 
R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  0.094  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.094  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.094  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00]  0.093  [0.00] 
Capital Expend. (%Total Assets)  0.074  [0.00]  0.075  [0.00]  0.075  [0.00]  0.075  [0.00]  0.075  [0.00]  0.075  [0.00]  0.075  [0.00]  0.076  [0.00]  0.076  [0.00]  0.076  [0.00] 
Percent Zero Returns  0.084  [0.00]  0.084  [0.00]  0.083  [0.00]  0.084  [0.00]  0.084  [0.00]  0.083  [0.00]  0.084  [0.00]  0.083  [0.00]  0.083  [0.00]  0.083  [0.00] 
Leverage  0.099  [0.00]  0.099  [0.00]  0.100  [0.00]  0.100  [0.00]  0.099  [0.00]  0.100  [0.00]  0.099  [0.00]  0.098  [0.00]  0.099  [0.00]  0.098  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  0.000  [0.98]  0.013  [0.38]  0.011  [0.30]  0.001  [0.94]  0.009  [0.49]  0.011  [0.51]  0.011  [0.40]  0.004  [0.63]  0.011  [0.34]  0.007  [0.56] 
Intercept  -0.014  [0.70]  -0.014  [0.70]  -0.014  [0.70]  -0.014  [0.72]  -0.014  [0.72]  -0.014  [0.69]  -0.014  [0.69]  -0.017  [0.63]  -0.017  [0.63]  -0.017  [0.61] 
Adjusted R
2  0.152    0.151    0.144    0.150    0.150    0.154    0.149    0.151    0.154    0.156   
Observations (average per year)  3701.1     3701.1     3701.1     3701.1     3701.1     3701.1     3701.1     3485.7     3485.7     3485.7    
(continued) 
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Table 7: Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions with Changes in Variables (continued) 
 
Panel B: Systematic risk 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  0.031  [0.26]          0.028  [0.14]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order      -0.004  [0.83]          -0.002  [0.91]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.009  [0.19]  0.008  [0.06]                  0.012  [0.01]  0.010  [0.29]  0.017  [0.05]  0.014  [0.17] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  -0.004  [0.86]  -0.026  [0.22]  -0.002  [0.93]          -0.019  [0.51]  -0.019  [0.46]  -0.020  [0.22]  -0.025  [0.14]  -0.025  [0.15] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  -0.013  [0.58]  -0.001  [0.97]      -0.010  [0.59]  -0.003  [0.91]  -0.007  [0.76]  -0.007  [0.75]  -0.007  [0.70]  -0.020  [0.29]  -0.015  [0.44] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                              0.029  [0.34]      0.025  [0.31] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                  0.034  [0.21]  0.016  [0.38] 
GDP per Capita                      -0.028  [0.12]                 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  -0.021  [0.38]  -0.026  [0.24]  -0.021  [0.34]  -0.023  [0.38]  -0.025  [0.31]  -0.027  [0.19]  -0.024  [0.16]  -0.036  [0.10]  -0.024  [0.30]  -0.029  [0.19] 
PPE (% Total Assets)  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.084  [0.00]  -0.085  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00] 
Gross Profit Margin ( 3 yr. avg.)  -0.068  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.068  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00]  -0.066  [0.00]  -0.067  [0.00] 
Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  0.082  [0.00]  0.082  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.083  [0.00]  0.083  [0.00]  0.082  [0.00]  0.082  [0.00]  0.080  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.080  [0.00] 
Debt Maturity   -0.019  [0.07]  -0.019  [0.08]  -0.020  [0.11]  -0.019  [0.08]  -0.019  [0.09]  -0.019  [0.05]  -0.019  [0.10]  -0.020  [0.03]  -0.019  [0.05]  -0.019  [0.06] 
R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  0.088  [0.00]  0.088  [0.00]  0.088  [0.00]  0.088  [0.00]  0.087  [0.00]  0.088  [0.00]  0.088  [0.00]  0.087  [0.00]  0.087  [0.00]  0.087  [0.00] 
Capital Expend. (%Total Assets)  0.060  [0.00]  0.060  [0.00]  0.061  [0.00]  0.060  [0.00]  0.061  [0.00]  0.060  [0.00]  0.060  [0.00]  0.063  [0.00]  0.062  [0.00]  0.063  [0.00] 
Percent Zero Returns  -0.040  [0.00]  -0.040  [0.00]  -0.040  [0.00]  -0.041  [0.01]  -0.041  [0.01]  -0.040  [0.00]  -0.040  [0.00]  -0.041  [0.00]  -0.042  [0.00]  -0.042  [0.00] 
Leverage  0.052  [0.00]  0.052  [0.00]  0.053  [0.00]  0.053  [0.00]  0.053  [0.00]  0.053  [0.00]  0.052  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.052  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  -0.011  [0.76]  0.016  [0.58]  0.014  [0.59]  -0.010  [0.74]  0.009  [0.73]  0.012  [0.72]  0.010  [0.75]  0.009  [0.63]  0.013  [0.61]  0.011  [0.63] 
Intercept  -0.031  [0.68]  -0.031  [0.68]  -0.031  [0.67]  -0.031  [0.67]  -0.031  [0.67]  -0.031  [0.64]  -0.031  [0.64]  -0.035  [0.65]  -0.035  [0.65]  -0.035  [0.61] 
Adjusted R
2  0.071    0.070    0.062    0.065    0.065    0.070    0.066    0.070    0.068    0.073   
Observations (average per year)  3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3485.4     3485.4     3485.4    
(continued) 
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Table 7: Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions with Changes in Variables (continued) 
 
Panel C: Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  0.015  [0.11]          0.013  [0.06]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order      0.004  [0.73]          0.005  [0.62]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.001  [0.76]  0.002  [0.61]                  0.001  [0.78]  -0.001  [0.91]  0.001  [0.79]  0.001  [0.83] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  -0.012  [0.16]  -0.013  [0.07]  -0.011  [0.12]          -0.019  [0.00]  -0.016  [0.01]  -0.013  [0.03]  -0.013  [0.09]  -0.014  [0.10] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  0.002  [0.89]  0.005  [0.70]      0.002  [0.87]  0.003  [0.70]  0.001  [0.90]  0.003  [0.75]  0.003  [0.81]  0.000  [0.96]  -0.001  [0.92] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                              0.000  [1.00]      -0.005  [0.51] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                  0.018  [0.16]  0.018  [0.09] 
GDP per Capita                      -0.019  [0.24]                 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  -0.012  [0.45]  -0.012  [0.44]  -0.018  [0.25]  -0.015  [0.22]  -0.015  [0.20]  -0.011  [0.54]  -0.013  [0.32]  -0.017  [0.18]  -0.011  [0.46]  -0.010  [0.34] 
PPE (% Total Assets)  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.092  [0.00]  -0.093  [0.00]  -0.093  [0.00]  -0.093  [0.00] 
Gross Profit Margin ( 3 yr. avg.)  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.087  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00] 
Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.082  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.081  [0.00]  0.080  [0.00]  0.080  [0.00]  0.080  [0.00] 
Debt Maturity   -0.065  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.066  [0.00]  -0.066  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00] 
R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  0.096  [0.00]  0.096  [0.00]  0.096  [0.00]  0.096  [0.00]  0.096  [0.00]  0.097  [0.00]  0.096  [0.00]  0.096  [0.00]  0.096  [0.00]  0.096  [0.00] 
Capital Expend. (%Total Assets)  0.077  [0.00]  0.077  [0.00]  0.077  [0.00]  0.077  [0.00]  0.078  [0.00]  0.077  [0.00]  0.077  [0.00]  0.078  [0.00]  0.078  [0.00]  0.078  [0.00] 
Percent Zero Returns  0.102  [0.00]  0.102  [0.00]  0.102  [0.00]  0.102  [0.00]  0.102  [0.00]  0.102  [0.00]  0.102  [0.00]  0.102  [0.00]  0.101  [0.00]  0.101  [0.00] 
Leverage  0.106  [0.00]  0.105  [0.00]  0.106  [0.00]  0.106  [0.00]  0.106  [0.00]  0.106  [0.00]  0.105  [0.00]  0.105  [0.00]  0.105  [0.00]  0.105  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  0.003  [0.83]  0.011  [0.37]  0.009  [0.29]  0.003  [0.75]  0.008  [0.43]  0.012  [0.33]  0.010  [0.29]  0.002  [0.82]  0.009  [0.25]  0.004  [0.62] 
Intercept  -0.010  [0.72]  -0.010  [0.72]  -0.010  [0.70]  -0.010  [0.75]  -0.010  [0.75]  -0.010  [0.71]  -0.010  [0.71]  -0.013  [0.60]  -0.013  [0.60]  -0.013  [0.59] 
Adjusted R
2  0.151    0.151    0.147    0.150    0.150    0.154    0.150    0.150    0.152    0.152   
Observations (average per year)  3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3485.4     3485.4     3485.4    
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Table 8: R
2 Differences 
This table reports results from different regression methods with differences in (logistic transformed) R
2 between non-U.S. firms and U.S. as the dependent variable. Panel A 
reports results from country-level Fama-MacBeth regressions. Panel B reports results from firm-level Fama-MacBeth regressions. Panel C reports results from firm-level 
Fama-MacBeth regressions with changes in variables. p-values are reported in brackets (values reported as [0.00] are less than 0.005). Standard errors are corrected with the 
Newey-West (1987) procedure. Explanatory variables are lagged for regressions with firm- and country-levels and standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation so 
that the intercept provides a test of the difference in R
2 between non-U.S. and U.S. firms and the magnitude of coefficients represents the effect on R
2 of a one standard 
deviation move in the explanatory variable. Observations is the average number of observations in the first stage cross-sectional regressions. Firms with more than 30% of local 
currency stock returns equal to zero in the previous year are excluded. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Country-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.130  [0.00]         -0.133  [0.00]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order     -0.142  [0.00]         -0.130  [0.00]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.030  [0.03]  0.047  [0.00]                  0.058  [0.00]  0.070  [0.00]  0.063  [0.00]  0.076  [0.00] 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index         -0.024  [0.11] -0.069  [0.00] -0.044  [0.01] -0.065  [0.01] -0.061  [0.02] -0.032  [0.32] -0.051  [0.08] -0.054  [0.09] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  -0.050  [0.00] -0.035  [0.03] -0.041  [0.04]         -0.036  [0.01] -0.055  [0.00] -0.009  [0.52] -0.016  [0.28] -0.009  [0.48] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  -0.053  [0.00] -0.056  [0.00]      0.005  [0.75] -0.009  [0.61]  0.002  [0.90] -0.008  [0.69]  0.016  [0.52] -0.014  [0.49]  0.013  [0.50] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                             -0.086  [0.00]     -0.072  [0.00] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                 -0.078  [0.00] -0.064  [0.00] 
GDP per Capita                     -0.135  [0.00]                 
Disclosure Index         -0.127  [0.00]             -0.120  [0.00] -0.119  [0.00] -0.109  [0.00] -0.091  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  -0.006  [0.79] -0.019  [0.30] -0.035  [0.09] -0.018  [0.43] -0.026  [0.19] -0.014  [0.57] -0.033  [0.09] -0.018  [0.25] -0.012  [0.40] -0.003  [0.83] 
Intercept  0.467  [0.00]  0.467  [0.00]  0.467  [0.00]  0.467  [0.00]  0.467  [0.00]  0.467  [0.00]  0.467  [0.00]  0.477  [0.00]  0.477  [0.00]  0.477  [0.00] 
Adjusted R
2  0.143    0.173    0.146    0.168    0.181    0.173    0.177    0.230    0.222    0.229   
Observations (average per year)  40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.8     40.0     40.0     40.0    
(continued) 
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Table 8: R
2 Differences (continued) 
 
Panel B: Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  -0.090  [0.00]          -0.087  [0.00]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order      -0.120  [0.00]          -0.121  [0.00]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.052  [0.03]  0.056  [0.03]                  0.080  [0.00]  0.070  [0.02]  0.075  [0.01]  0.076  [0.01] 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index          0.005  [0.76]  -0.026  [0.21]  -0.029  [0.17]  -0.046  [0.00]  -0.076  [0.02]  -0.031  [0.27]  -0.043  [0.13]  -0.032  [0.32] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  -0.066  [0.00]  -0.063  [0.00]  -0.069  [0.00]          -0.070  [0.00]  -0.098  [0.00]  -0.080  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00]  -0.086  [0.00] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  -0.021  [0.41]  -0.019  [0.41]      0.033  [0.18]  0.036  [0.13]  0.031  [0.28]  0.034  [0.28]  0.021  [0.48]  0.015  [0.63]  0.016  [0.58] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                              -0.026  [0.24]      -0.020  [0.31] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                  -0.018  [0.26]  -0.005  [0.73] 
GDP per Capita                      -0.107  [0.00]                 
Disclosure Index          -0.108  [0.01]              -0.119  [0.00]  -0.149  [0.00]  -0.153  [0.00]  -0.151  [0.00] 
PPE (% Total Assets)  0.011  [0.11]  0.008  [0.27]  0.010  [0.11]  0.014  [0.02]  0.010  [0.11]  0.012  [0.06]  0.005  [0.39]  0.005  [0.52]  0.005  [0.57]  0.005  [0.44] 
Gross Profit Margin ( 3 yr. avg.)  0.037  [0.00]  0.033  [0.00]  0.033  [0.00]  0.042  [0.00]  0.039  [0.00]  0.044  [0.00]  0.031  [0.00]  0.030  [0.00]  0.030  [0.00]  0.030  [0.00] 
Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  0.006  [0.52]  0.003  [0.71]  -0.001  [0.94]  0.004  [0.79]  0.001  [0.96]  0.012  [0.25]  -0.001  [0.94]  0.002  [0.83]  0.001  [0.96]  0.002  [0.89] 
Debt Maturity   0.056  [0.00]  0.064  [0.00]  0.063  [0.00]  0.059  [0.00]  0.066  [0.00]  0.054  [0.00]  0.064  [0.00]  0.059  [0.00]  0.060  [0.00]  0.059  [0.00] 
R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  -0.006  [0.52]  -0.004  [0.66]  -0.006  [0.48]  -0.006  [0.50]  -0.004  [0.65]  -0.010  [0.27]  -0.005  [0.43]  -0.007  [0.40]  -0.007  [0.37]  -0.007  [0.38] 
Capital Expend. (%Total Assets)  -0.029  [0.00]  -0.030  [0.01]  -0.028  [0.00]  -0.033  [0.00]  -0.032  [0.00]  -0.031  [0.00]  -0.027  [0.02]  -0.027  [0.02]  -0.026  [0.03]  -0.027  [0.04] 
Percent Zero Returns  -0.202  [0.00]  -0.199  [0.00]  -0.197  [0.00]  -0.194  [0.00]  -0.193  [0.00]  -0.198  [0.00]  -0.197  [0.00]  -0.200  [0.00]  -0.199  [0.00]  -0.199  [0.00] 
Leverage  -0.046  [0.00]  -0.052  [0.00]  -0.060  [0.00]  -0.053  [0.00]  -0.058  [0.00]  -0.046  [0.00]  -0.057  [0.00]  -0.064  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00]  -0.065  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  0.067  [0.01]  0.045  [0.07]  0.049  [0.04]  0.059  [0.01]  0.038  [0.12]  0.079  [0.01]  0.023  [0.22]  0.019  [0.17]  0.026  [0.12]  0.027  [0.14] 
Intercept  0.382  [0.00]  0.382  [0.00]  0.382  [0.00]  0.382  [0.00]  0.382  [0.00]  0.382  [0.00]  0.382  [0.00]  0.400  [0.00]  0.400  [0.00]  0.400  [0.00] 
Adjusted R
2  0.132    0.140    0.131    0.123    0.132    0.133    0.147    0.159    0.158    0.161   
Observations (average per year)  5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     5116.7     4799.9     4799.9     4799.9    
(continued) 
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Table 8: R
2 Differences (continued) 
 
Panel C: Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions with Changes in Variables 
 
   Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val  Coef.  p-val 
ICR Political Risk - Stability  0.020  [0.25]          0.019  [0.19]                         
ICR Political Risk - Law & Order      -0.008  [0.71]          -0.009  [0.61]                     
Creditor Rights Index  0.013  [0.12]  0.010  [0.23]                  0.014  [0.03]  0.012  [0.30]  0.018  [0.06]  0.014  [0.26] 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  0.002  [0.96]  -0.019  [0.51]  0.007  [0.78]          -0.006  [0.82]  -0.008  [0.76]  -0.009  [0.66]  -0.013  [0.54]  -0.014  [0.39] 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  -0.007  [0.73]  -0.001  [0.98]      -0.002  [0.90]  0.003  [0.87]  0.001  [0.95]  -0.005  [0.85]  -0.007  [0.72]  -0.016  [0.49]  -0.014  [0.47] 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)                              0.029  [0.19]      0.029  [0.21] 
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)                                  0.027  [0.16]  0.011  [0.36] 
GDP per Capita                      -0.015  [0.51]                 
PPE (% Total Assets)  0.008  [0.47]  0.008  [0.48]  0.008  [0.54]  0.009  [0.45]  0.008  [0.47]  0.009  [0.48]  0.008  [0.45]  0.006  [0.56]  0.007  [0.54]  0.007  [0.59] 
Gross Profit Margin ( 3 yr. avg.)  0.021  [0.01]  0.022  [0.01]  0.021  [0.04]  0.021  [0.01]  0.021  [0.01]  0.022  [0.02]  0.021  [0.03]  0.021  [0.01]  0.022  [0.01]  0.021  [0.02] 
Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  0.000  [0.99]  0.001  [0.89]  0.000  [0.98]  0.001  [0.92]  0.002  [0.88]  0.000  [0.97]  0.000  [0.97]  -0.001  [0.95]  0.000  [0.99]  -0.001  [0.94] 
Debt Maturity   0.051  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.051  [0.01]  0.051  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00]  0.052  [0.00]  0.051  [0.00] 
R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  -0.009  [0.37]  -0.009  [0.37]  -0.010  [0.33]  -0.009  [0.39]  -0.009  [0.39]  -0.010  [0.32]  -0.009  [0.34]  -0.011  [0.28]  -0.010  [0.31]  -0.011  [0.25] 
Capital Expend. (%Total Assets)  -0.019  [0.23]  -0.019  [0.23]  -0.019  [0.17]  -0.019  [0.18]  -0.019  [0.18]  -0.019  [0.19]  -0.019  [0.18]  -0.017  [0.28]  -0.018  [0.27]  -0.017  [0.28] 
Percent Zero Returns  -0.156  [0.00]  -0.155  [0.00]  -0.157  [0.00]  -0.158  [0.00]  -0.157  [0.00]  -0.156  [0.00]  -0.155  [0.00]  -0.157  [0.00]  -0.158  [0.00]  -0.158  [0.00] 
Leverage  -0.060  [0.00]  -0.060  [0.00]  -0.060  [0.00]  -0.060  [0.00]  -0.059  [0.00]  -0.060  [0.00]  -0.060  [0.00]  -0.061  [0.00]  -0.060  [0.00]  -0.061  [0.00] 
Market Coverage  -0.015  [0.67]  0.002  [0.95]  0.002  [0.95]  -0.019  [0.51]  -0.002  [0.92]  0.002  [0.94]  -0.005  [0.85]  0.013  [0.58]  0.005  [0.86]  0.012  [0.64] 
Intercept  -0.024  [0.67]  -0.024  [0.67]  -0.024  [0.72]  -0.024  [0.68]  -0.024  [0.68]  -0.024  [0.69]  -0.024  [0.69]  -0.023  [0.70]  -0.023  [0.70]  -0.023  [0.73] 
Adjusted R
2  0.064    0.067    0.056    0.058    0.061    0.067    0.062    0.065    0.062    0.066   
Observations (average per year)  3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3700.9     3485.4     3485.4     3485.4    
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Variable  Definition 
Firm Characteristics   
Total Assets  The sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and 
equipment and other assets. 
Age  Difference between year of observation and year of first listing + 1 
Market-to-Book Value  Common Equity Market Price-Year End / Book Value Per Share 
p-score  Propensity score of being a Non-U.S. firm, estimated each year by 
industry 
Leverage  (Total Debt + Preferred Stock) divided by Size 
Closely Held Shares (%)  Number of Closely Held Shares divided by Common Shares Outstanding 
PPE (% Total Assets)  Total Property Plant & Equipment (Net) divided by Total Assets 
R&D Expense (% Total Assets)  Research and Development Expenses as a percent of Total Assets with 
missing values set to zero 
Capital Expenditures (% Total Assets)  Capital Expenditures divided by Total Assets with missing values set to 
zero 
Gross Profit Margin (3 year average)  Average of up to 3 years (as available) of Gross Income divided by Net 
Sales or Revenues, where Gross Income is the difference between sales or 
revenues and cost of goods sold and depreciation 
Cash & STI (% Total Assets)  Cash and Short-term Investments divided by (Total Assets – Cash and 
Short-term Investments) 
Debt Maturity  Total Long-term Debt (due in more than 1 year) divided by Total Debt 
Percent Zero Returns  Percentage of available firm weekly returns in a year that are equal to zero 
(excluding leading and trailing strings of zeros)  
Total Debt  Book Value of Long-term Debt plus Short-term Debt including all interest 
bearing and capitalized lease obligations. 
Size  Year End Market Capitalization + Total Debt + Preferred Stock 
Preferred Stock  Book Value of preferred shares outstanding 
Total Risk  Annualized standard deviation of weekly stock return measured in U.S. 
Dollars 
Systematic risk  Annualized square root of difference in weekly return variance and 
variance of residuals from regression with weekly excess returns from 
local market index 
Idiosyncratic Risk  Annualized standard deviation of residuals from regression with weekly 
excess returns from local market index 
R
2  R
2 from regression with weekly excess returns from local market index 
   
Country & Other Characteristics   
ICR Political  From PRS Group. Index measures the overall stability and quality of 
government institutions using 10 different qualitative measures such as 
internal and external conflict, corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic 
quality. Higher values represent more stable and higher quality 
government institutions. 
ICR Political - Stability  Sub-index of ICR Political that includes only government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, internal conflict, external conflict, military in 
politics, religious tensions, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability. 
Higher values represent more stable government. 
ICR Political – Law and Order  Sub-index of ICR Political that includes only law and order, investment 
profile, bureaucracy quality, corruption. Higher values represent higher 
quality government institutions. 
Creditor Rights Index  From Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) 
   
Anti-self-dealing Index  From Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer (2005) 
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Variable  Definition 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio  Ratio of annual trading volume to shares outstanding. Data from World 
Bank 
Stock Market Capital (% GDP)  Ratio of end of year stock market capitalization to Nominal GDP. Data 
from World Bank 
Bank Private Credit (% GDP)  Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP from World Bank Financial 
Development and Structure Database. Raw data are from the electronic 
version of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  See Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Levine (2000).   
Bank & Other Private Credit (% GDP)  Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to 
GDP from World Bank Financial Development and Structure Database. 
Raw data are from the electronic version of the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics.  See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine (2000).  
Private Bond Capital (% GDP)  Private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and  
corporations as a share of GDP from World Bank Financial Development 
and Structure Database. Raw data are taken from the electronic version of 
the Bank of International Settlements' Quarterly Review: International 
Banking and Financial Market Developments by sector and country of 
issuer.  See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine (2000).  
Public Bond Capital (% GDP)  Public domestic debt securities issued by government as a share of GDP 
from World Bank Financial Development and Structure Database. Raw 
data are taken from the electronic version of the Bank of International 
Settlements' Quarterly Review: International Banking and Financial 
Market Developments by sector and country of issuer. See Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Levine (2000).  
Total External Capital (% GDP)  Sum of Stock Market Capital (% GDP), Bank & Other Private Credit (% 
GDP),  Private Bond Capital (% GDP), Public Bond Capital (% GDP). 
GDP Per Capita  GDP per capita on a purchasing power parity basis (millions of USD). 
Data from the World Bank. 
Disclosure Index  As defined in Jin and Myers (2005), additional data from Global 
Competitiveness Reports (1999, 2000). 
Domestic Market Index Volatility  Annualized standard deviation of weekly major market index returns as 
reported by Datastream. 
Market Coverage  Percentage of all listed firms in a country that are in our sample. Data on 
the total number of listings comes from the World Federation of 
Exchanges (supplemented by data hand collected from individual 
exchange websites) and includes only local country listings. 
 
 